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PROLOGUE TO POLITICS

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PROLOGUE TO POLITICS

By

CHARLES E. MERRIAM



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PREFACE

THESE lectures were given in April, 1939, under the broad title of "Systematic Politics" in the series conducted by the Division of Social Sciences of the University of Chicago. They constitute a preface to a much more formal and extended discussion of political science which I have long had in preparation; and beyond this there is also my "Epilogue to Politics."

I am indebted to the Social Science Research Committee of the University of Chicago for assistance in the preparation and analysis of this material, and in particular I wish to express my appreciation of the help given by my research assistants—Dr. Gabriel Almond, Mr. Harold L. Elstien, and Mr. Louis T. Olom.

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I

THE ORGANIZATION OF VIOLENCE

THE world's experience with violence and with consent has been a very long one. History and literature are filled with examples of both and of elaborate and well-wrought reasoning about both. Precepts in the prephilosophical period, sharp analyses in philosophy and in ethics, acute reasoning in the field of juristics, including the canon, the civil, and the common law—the whole wide range of *naturrecht* speculation—all these have enriched our knowledge of the problems involved in these opposing types of influencing human behavior.

I am using the word "violence" not in the technical sense of force, but with reference to physical force in its raw forms. The lash, the prison, the sword—these are examples of the employment of what I have in mind by "violence." If this is an unusual or incorrect usage, it is, at any rate, the sense in which I am employing the term, and I may be checked accordingly.

Looking at political and social behavior, one may ask: How is concurrent action obtained in any given group? The other day I was the guest of the Yale Laboratory of Anthropoid Biology in Florida—known to me as the "Simian University."¹ I had an opportunity to take a closer look at the social behavior of some forty apes. Under the careful eye of Dr. Yerkes their co-operative and non-co-operative acts are carefully observed, recorded, and analyzed. The

* Numbers refer to the bibliographical material given in the Appendix at the end of the book.

doctor can inform you on the length of time it takes for two apes to learn how to press simultaneously two buttons, which, when pressed, start a little tray loaded with fruit toward the concentration camp in which they are confined. They can also illustrate the beginnings of traits of leadership in simple situations. When I asked the doctor whether he made any use of violence, he said he found the use of the water hose the most effective technique for making the simians vote right, so to speak. Incidentally, some of the apes learned how to use the same garden hose for the purpose of taking a mouthful of water and sprinkling the human observers of their slavery. I may say in passing, however, that it is difficult to reduce the sly apes to slavery, for they are wise enough not to learn to do anything useful. They make their masters feed them, and they will not even become employable. I almost envied their intelligence in thus setting up a protective wall around their personalities, if this is the proper term—in any case “animalities.”

A wide range of studies has been under way for a number of years in closely related fields. There are studies in subhuman societies, especially studies of the primates;² studies of primitives;³ studies of children under various experimental plans;⁴ studies in the domain of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and psychology dealing with aggressive and nonaggressive types and with domination and deference,⁵ with leadership in many aspects; and studies in competition and co-operation.⁶ All these, taken together, constitute a mass of observation and reflection, not yet approaching the dignity of scientific conclusions and not yielding large returns in the form of generalizations. When these inquiries are farther advanced, they will greatly illuminate the inner meaning of the process by which men are influenced by others in their social behavior; and in

that day we shall be able to trace the meandering lines that mark the patterns running from coercion to free consent.⁷

In dealing here with the organization of violence and then with the organization of consent, the question may appropriately be put: What is the difference between violence and consent? For the purposes of this book I shall deal first with violence, without too close an analysis of the lines that separate violence from consent. Consent is perhaps more complicated than violence, and I shall discuss it more fully in the following chapter.

Among the bases of aggregation in political communities—a large topic in itself—are usually included: custom, violence, and reason—with, of course, many intermediate forms not sharply defined or distinguished one from another. Bryce indicates: indolence, deference, sympathy, fear, and reason.⁸

Custom provides an automatic, or almost automatic, form of social control—at least a form in which conscious analysis of the terms and conditions of political action is very dimly outlined.⁹ Custom is the great balance wheel which goes on without much attention to its operations—or, if with attention, then without challenge of the ritual with which it is surrounded. How does custom come to be custom? Usually by a long series of pattern-making and modifications, imperceptible in its slow accretion. But at other times custom rests on some great event in the life of the group—out of which comes some monument of stone or some pattern of behavior. There is memorial and immemorial custom. Customs can also be manufactured and can pass over into the habitual. In the early days at the University of Chicago the old song of '93 ran: "Profs make the student customs at the U."

Once established, it is indeed difficult to argue with a ceremonial procedure, as it is difficult to argue about a form of etiquette in which one is enveloped for the moment;¹⁰ but in government the secret of the continuity of custom lies in the presence at all times of a system for the authentic interpretation of old custom in a new situation. The British aristocracy is an example of a method of determining "what is done and what is not done," authentically in a wide range of instances over a long period of time. Or a court may declare our immemorial custom, making it as they go.

Custom is supplemented by violence, which whips the flagging automatism or the resisting challenge into submission or conformity. Of this there are many variations, many nuances. The organization of raw violence has always been one of the major problems of politics.

Reason provides another form of motivation for social and political conformity and is far more delicate in its shades than the others. I shall make it the subject of discussion in the next chapter, on consent.

We must also reckon with the fact that there are wide-ranging variations of attitude and interest in different personalities, and indeed in the same personality at different times. The calculation of these uncertain interests and situations is one of the major problems of the political. There is foul weather, as well as fair, to test our dams; there are fires, famines, and plagues to upset the day; and there are wars and rumors of wars to reckon with. Varying situations condition the degree and type of interest. There are human beings of a master type, and there are those of a slave type; there are rebel types.¹¹

The place of violence in the structure and activities of the state has been one of the most mooted problems in the

whole domain of governmental inquiry.¹² (1) There are those who maintain that violence is the essential characteristic of the state and that therefore the state should be liquidated. (2) There are those who maintain that violence is an essential and leading characteristic of the state and that therefore violence should be proclaimed and exalted. (3) There are those who hold to a *via media* between these opposing doctrines.

1. The anarchists have consistently held that force is the chief mark of the state and that, accordingly, such an organization should be relegated to the scrap heap. Prince Kropotkin shows in his *Memoirs of a Revolutionist* how he became an anarchist as a result of his experience in a military training school as a youth. Marx declared the state the instrument of the capitalist for the promotion of his property interest and therefore demanded the abolition altogether of the organized state.¹³

Variations of the anarchistic theme are, of course, furnished by the groups of those who protest against a special form of violence, such as war, and those who hold to the theory and practice of nonresistance. I shall not discuss pacifism on this occasion, for this is based upon direct opposition to the organization of violence for military purposes, although not necessarily for nonmilitary purposes of ordinary punishment.

Nonresistance of the oriental type is exemplified conspicuously in the doctrines and behavior of Gandhi. Here we find the theory of "soul force" as a method of resistance to violence, often successfully and ingeniously employed under the redoubtable leadership of the Hindu prophet. A student of British law and of Indian custom, he has been able to weave an amazing pattern of the possibilities of organized nonviolence, of love against hate, of nonresist-

ance against aggression. No student of the nature of authority can neglect the extraordinary tactics and the unusual success he has been able to obtain in a long and varied series of defeats of organized government and of organized violence.¹⁴

2. In the older theories of despotism and in the current Nazi theory force emerges as a central factor in political association, both in internal and in external relations alike. In Carl Schmitt's conception of the political, force stands out as the important element in what he calls "decisionism."¹⁵ In international relations Mussolini and Hitler have repeatedly proclaimed the significance of might as the basis of right. These eulogies of war and violence are characteristic of Nietzsche and of other writers who glory in the patterns of violent struggle.¹⁶

3. Somewhere between the doctrine that force has no place in human association and the doctrine that force is the god of human relations lies the truth. In the ideal state physical violence would be unnecessary and out of date, but in the practical state a way must be found for the organization and canalization of such violence as may be inevitable at a given time. Let us consider the *via media*.

The sound theoretical position is not centered in the glorification of violence as such or in the complete repudiation of the use of all force in political relations. Dewey maintains that "squeamishness about force is the mark not of idealistic but of moonshine morals. . . ." The criterion of determination lies, he believes, "in the relative efficiency and economy of the expenditure of force as a means to an end." He continues: "Immoral use of force is a stupid use."¹⁷

The process of civilization involves a developing restraint of the impulse to immediate violence. Jostled, we

glare, perhaps, but do not strike. Slandered, we do not shout, but sue, perhaps. Struck, of course, we may strike back. Even in war, which is the highest organization of violence, discipline enters, and the soldier is trained to restrain his combative impulses at many points; they are canalized at least. Traditionally, he must not strike back if his superior slaps or kicks him insolently. He must become angry to order—hating someone he knows little of or someone he likes. He hates and kills to order.¹⁸ Even in the prize ring the fighter must not lose his temper but must “keep his head.”

Pacifists, on the other hand, are often notoriously pugnacious—except with their hands. You may recall that Phineas, the Quaker in *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, did not strike his enemy but merely extended a nonresisting hand, so that the enemy, meeting the hand, fell down the cliff.

Whether or not violence is the characteristic mark of the state, the wise use of force presents one of the most puzzling problems of any government. This is especially true in free governments, but it is basic in all types of governance, free or otherwise.

How can we be sure, when we hand the gun to our special servant, that he will not turn it against us? This is the ancient and uneasy query echoing down from time immemorial: *Quis custodiet custodes ipsos?* Curiously enough, the decisions are often made by codes of honor or forms of custom (taboos and the like) rather than by steel and chemicals. What I am saying is that what seems violence is, in one sense, quite the opposite.

Is a wounded soldier, being carried away from the battlefield on the back of his foe, justified in shooting his rescuer with the latter's pistol? This is determined not by violence but by custom.

It is not wholly the gun, but the idea in the mind of the man who holds the gun and deliberates whether to pull the trigger or not. Police Inspector Javert in *Les Misérables* is the classic of all cases of this type.

There are three principal aspects of this problem: (1) the organization of violence in relation to the treatment of ordinary social deviations in the category of crime; (2) the organization of violence in relation to dissident groups on the edge of legality; and (3) the organization of violence in military form. They are all the same problem, but the central question is seen from different points of view.

In dealing with ordinary crime, more progress has been made than elsewhere, and I shall discuss this very briefly.

1. The state has taken over the monopoly of violence. Private wars are banned, in the main, in recent times; also, private vengeance by force. Even the duel is on the decline.¹⁹ Casual hooliganism, accompanied by violence, is still with us from time to time but, in the main, tends to disappear. The organized underworld blossoms out here and there with banditry and murder but, in the main, is increasingly beset with obstacles by the state, as communication and transportation integrate central control. Lynchings and private justice are on the way out.

The treatment of crime has changed, in the main, from repression to prevention.²⁰ Beatings and brandings and mutilations—diabolical torture—are on the decline. Capital punishment is restricted in its application, and slowly—very slowly, too slowly—the prison looks in the direction of the hospital. Education, medicine, recreation—the whole apparatus of social and economic organization—is being utilized in an effort to control in advance, to prevent the conditions out of which social deviations of a distressing type arise.

This process is a long way from completion at the present time, but there is every reason to believe that in the not-too-distant future the goal will be reached. True, Butler's *Erehwon* in 1872 predicted the time when those who carelessly became sick would be punished rather than those whose natures drove them to crime. But, by and large, the process of prevention, the rule of management without force, is on its way. The general principle of prevention has been accepted, and the details of management are in course of development. A shot in the arm even takes the place of a strait jacket.²¹ When Al Smith demands a jury of psychiatrists to aid the court, we may read the writing on the wall; or when the Sing Sing football team (according to the movies) begs the governor not to pardon its star halfback, we know that something is happening in crime treatment.

2. The problem of violence and its application becomes more difficult as we deal with dissident groups of persons instead of individuals; with races, religions, regions, and interest groupings of various types; with special forms of ideology and propaganda.²²

Let it be said at the outset that this is not, as some suppose, a problem peculiar to democratic states but a general problem of all organized governments of whatever type, for this goes down to the roots of morale in the political association.

It is very simple to say that whoever disagrees with the ruling powers shall die or be imprisoned, but this is not done under any government and could not be enforced. All governments find some *raison d'état* for action, however transparent they may seem at home or abroad.²³

How far may we go, it may be asked, in tolerance or oppression of the special practices of various races, or of

various religious beliefs, or of special neighborhoods, or of special classes of occupations, of interests, or of special groups interested in particular types of propaganda or of education?

Many factors enter into the calculations here—confusing perhaps. What if the ought of the state conflicts with the ought of other groups—let us say the church?²⁴ Or of a special racial group, or a class? And who shall say what is the relative oughtness of the respective oughts? At this point conflicting answers may be returned. At a given moment the state authorities decide; but there is an appeal from their verdict to reason, experience, and judgment beyond that special and local decision, authentic though it may be in the special framework in which it was set.

The religious problem has flamed out for centuries. Industrial groupings are often hot fields of controversy. Colonial expansion has brought about the sharpest clashes. Racial minorities have been the magnetic center of disturbance from time immemorial and are not ended, alas, in our day.

Now racial-nationality propagandas—pro and con—become disturbers of the peace of the community. Let us look at the latter problem only for the moment.

May the state permit the organization of private armies, with uniforms, barracks, drillings, parades, and mimic warfare? May the state permit the operations of associations aiming at its overthrow by violence?²⁵ May the state exercise violence to prevent free discussion of the fundamental principles of governmental associations?

✓ To these queries two replies may be given—one very general and the other special in nature. (a) In general the state permits all forms of discussion and association not substantially threatening its existence and operation. (b)

The state represses all organization and action constituting a substantial disturbance of the peace and a menace to the safety of the state.

Beyond this statement of principle the field is one of management and administration of public order, subject (a) to judicial appeal and protection and (b) to legislative review and reversal of administrative management. I do not take "administrative management" to mean the decision of the officer on the beat alone but to include also the mature judgment of administrative officials charged with the maintenance of the public safety and order. This judgment might well be supplemented by the advice of citizens consulted for this special purpose, contributing their special knowledge of local situations and their relation to the commonweal. In the case of instructional problems these are obviously the primary responsibility of the professional and technical group in charge of education at the given time, with ultimate review in the light of state policy.

The real difficulty often lies in (a) lack of good will to reach the right results; (b) lack of intelligence regarding the basic situations out of which the clash comes; (c) indecision or panicky and hysterical attitudes in decision;²⁶ and (d) lack of imagination and inventiveness in contriving wise ways of meeting emergencies. In general these sum up the lack of administrative *savoir-faire* in dealing with minorities and in understanding the methods of morale maintenance in a society.

If ill will, indecision, ignorance, narrowness, hysteria, and insensitivity dominate the scene, they are met by the deep-seated capacity of groups for devising ways and means of legal resistance. Gandhi's ingenuity in keeping within the letter of the law while breaking its spirit is a modern illustration of a practice that is as old as human as-

sociation in one form and another. Any school child can furnish information as to how to tease the teacher within the law. In such cases there is an equity that softens the strictness of the law to good advantage, but there is also an equity that tightens up the law a little, also to good advantage at times—as Shylock discovered.

In dealing with ingenious dissidents, seeking to break the spirit of the law while keeping within its letter, it is also useful to observe what Bagehot once called “illogical moderation.” In such cases I should prefer one who is not a logician by profession but an expert administrator, to one who is a logician by profession but not an administrator. The logician would undoubtedly outtalk them, but a man convinced against his will is of the same opinion still. The former would outmaneuver them so that they would seem to be opposing themselves rather than the administration—blaming themselves and not the agent of the law.

When Theodore Roosevelt was police commissioner of New York City, an anti-Semitic lecturer demanded protection for his talk, alleging that he feared riotous interruption by Jews of the neighborhood. When the speaker arose to begin his address, he found the entire room encircled by an unbroken cordon of policemen, every one of whom bore on his face the unmistakable marks of Semitism. The meeting broke up in a loud guffaw.

Another illustration of intelligent dealing with a critical situation of the same sort was seen in Mayor La Guardia's recent furnishing of protection for the office of the German consul by an armed guard of Jewish policemen.

In the final analysis “illogical moderation” is not really illogical at all. It is the highest intelligence directed toward a definite end. The action may proceed as if by in-

tuition but could be broken down, in slow movie style, into its constituent rational components.

We are not much concerned with the color or quality of shirts men may wear. They should certainly have shirts as a basic minimum on the American standard of living. But we are concerned as to what they are carrying in their hip pockets. If anyone makes a false move toward his hip pocket, it is an immemorial custom in America to be sure to shoot first.

What I am saying in brief on a very large question, which ought to be discussed at much greater length, is in substance a plea for—

a) Deeper study in advance of centers of conflict. The engineers watch carefully what are called “sand boils” alongside the great levees that guard the Mississippi. These are signs that the flood may break through under the dam. For this purpose of prestudy, public or private commissions of inquiry may serve an indispensable function of analysis and prevention.

b) Better organization of controversy in which all sides are represented as a means of arriving by rational discussion at common conclusions regarding political policy. Adult education, town halls and forums, and round tables are doing much, but more remains to be done—and perhaps more spontaneously. Discussion groups spring up everywhere, listening in on, and following up, radio broadcast discussions.²⁷

c) Wisdom in administrative management of focal situations. Difficult cases ought not to be left to the man at the desk alone but are the proper subject of mature consideration by trained and mature persons, with all the technical advice available. Advisory boards of the right type

might be useful, but they are not a panacea; they might be packed.

3. A major problem in the organization of violence is presented by international relations. Until a jural order of the world is established, nations will maintain armed forces for their national defense—forces more or less elaborate according to the strategic situation or the temper of the particular state.

But how shall the nation protect itself against its own protectors if there arises a difference of judgment between them?²⁸ Evidently the effective restraint upon the power-hunger of an army will not be that of superior physical force; it must be a form of control arising from custom and wont, resting, perhaps, upon a rational basis.

Perhaps the general who might take political power does not want it for personal reasons, preferring military command under direction. Perhaps he recognizes the system of civil-military relations and accepts it as sound. Perhaps the soldiers who make up his army recognize the principle of policy determination by civil authorities and are not willing to embark upon a countercourse. Guns are important in military organization, but so is the willingness to obey. The Russians had an army of some eight million at the close of the World War, but one fine day it melted away. The will to obey disappeared, leaving commands but no response.

If the head of the army is also the head of the state and is, at one and the same time, a general and a statesman, the solution is relatively easy—just as easy as the idea of the philosopher-king of classic renown. There are, of course, Caesars and Napoleons and Washingtons, but more commonly the virtue of the military leader and the virtue of the political leader are not found in the same man. Musso-

lini has a military pose, but in the war he rated a corporal. Hitler's language is sanguinary, but he, too, was ranked a corporal. Hindenburg and Ludendorf would be given about the same relative rating as political leaders—ward committeemen. General Grant will always be admired as a soldier, but he did not add to his distinction in the field of politics.

The truth is that the most neglected of subjects in the whole domain of political science is that of the organization of military violence in relation to political government. Our courses in government were, for a long time, called "Civil Government," and are sometimes so called even today. Even the wide vogue of public administration leaves military administration as dry as a desert, with hardly an oasis. Neither, with few exceptions, have the students of parties and public opinion done any better. The reason for this in the main is the assumption that there should be no violence in the rational state, and that in a democratic state especially organized violence is a shameful thing that may best be ignored, outside the ranks of the career-military officials. Modern democracy has neglected the role of armies in the modern state because it was absorbed in the contemplation of the ideal state—without war. At the same time, many liberals have recoiled from the collective security which would guarantee a world of peace.

Nationalism put an end to the endless feuds of petty lords, but it did not put an end to the greater wars of the greater units emerging in the place of the older little principalities and feudalities. An English historian has well described the ways and means by which the early English liberals starved the army because they feared—and, indeed, experience with Cromwell showed—it might be used against them. On the other hand, the relations between the

military and the civil authorities, once war broke out, were ill prepared and sadly defective.²⁹ Similar accounts of German experience have recently been developed by Huber and Hoehn³⁰ in comprehensive works showing the long struggle between military administration and efficiency and the democratic movement in the German state.

But is this a subject with which democratic states may concern themselves? Or is this not a topic for the professional students of military administration? What have we to do with brute force? Some say: Let us take the Oxford Oath and turn the other cheek.³¹ Not for me. Perhaps the most peaceful person in the world, I find myself from time to time engaged in controversy—obliged to defend myself in youth, to defend my country in war, to defend myself in politics, to defend my university's freedom of inquiry.

The following conclusions are pertinent.

1. We must concern ourselves with force in order that we may be able to reason—in order that we may carry on the pursuits in which we wish to engage. We must set up a world in which the values we cherish may live and grow and come to their special forms of perfection.

In the modern world, with its modes of communication and transportation, we cannot lose ourselves "in the vast woods where flows the Oregon." There is no longer any space for the hermit. An expedition, organized by some anthropologist, would find us out and take movies of our hermitage. The scientists are at the door, applying anthropological methods to contemporary society.

2. What we call "violence" is indeed an inferior form of organization itself. It is the task of reason to examine this organization, to understand it, to invent forms of reorganization which are superior in type and which may come into general acceptance as we go along. Violence is really the

inferior organization of vital life-forces. We do not seek to abolish energies: we aim at their reasonable control.

In modern times the weapons of warfare are the product of very high intelligence. Where do high explosives come from? Who invents airplanes and tanks? Who are the authorities in ballistics? In wartime they summoned one group of scientists to work on submarine detectors; another group for ballistics and trajectories of artillery; still another to decipher codes; they drafted the doctors for surgery and care; they recruited specialists for propaganda; they called upon administrators for administration; and so forth.

The difficulty is not with the high explosive per se but with the purposes to which it is devoted in a given situation. The organization of violence is a technical question, to answer which, men of reason will be called. There is no reason why bandits and gangsters and gorillas should be given the secrets of the laboratory, of management, of psychology, of medicine, for their bandit purposes alone.³²

Science is properly modest and tentative in its conclusions, where the data are not complete; yet in situations where action is imminent, urgent, and unavoidable, it is not scientific to do nothing because all cannot be done. We aim even if the aim is imperfect. We save the drowning with a smash on the jaw perhaps; we lose a limb to save a life; we chance an operation sometimes when death is the grim alternative.

It is one of the tasks of political science to undertake the solution of the critical problem of the organization of violence—military violence—in its relationship to the political controls and guiding points of the occasion. Before the storm breaks, we may consider what the storm will be like, what it will do, and how we shall meet these new situ-

ations.³³ This is the way that ships are sailed and the way that ships of state may be navigated by their commanders and their crew.

If you learn how to breathe when swimming, you do not fall into a panic when you swallow a little water. If you know what the incidents of war and emergency are, you do not collapse, paralyzed with unreasoning fear, but you adjust yourself to the known, even if unpleasant. The passengers keep quiet during the storm, but afterward they may be heard—in *extenso* perhaps.

One of the most difficult of all problems is, of course, that of knowing when, as technician, to keep silent and when to insist and assert. President Jefferson Davis, during the Civil War, found it difficult to determine his proper relationship with the military commanders and fell into the habit of appearing on the field of battle with a considerable staff surrounding him. But when he encountered General Lee, this military commander was outraged and asked of President Davis whose retinue this was, observing the engagement. I do not care whose they are, he went on to say; I do not want them here any longer. They went away, and the civil leader did not return to the field of battle under the regime of General Lee.

What and when decisions are to be made by the expert or the actor is partly a matter of personal interrelationship, but is also in part a subject of rational inquiry, supplemented by observation and experiment.

I do not have and do not profess to have the answers to all these questions. But I point out that these problems are a part of the subject matter of inquiry in the field of government, and I urge³⁴ that attention be given to this segment of our social and political life, by those who are competent in this type of inquiry, inventive in their capac-

ity, and practical in their judgment. They can tell us, if they will, more than we now know about the meaning of emergencies, about violence patterns, about the organization of violence in relation to consent, about the relative meaning and utility of discipline and initiative, about the role of the expert and the responsible actor, about the training of those who are in the service of the democracy even if practicing violence, and about the training and attitudes of those who command violence or support it but are not technically trained in its arts.

If we look at the organization of military violence in a modern state, we find a very complex pattern of organization and action:

1. The relationship between the army, naval, and air forces
2. The relationship between (a) these military administrators and (b) the civilian administration
3. The relationship between all these administrators taken together—army, navy, air, civilian—on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the economic structure and process of the nation
4. The relationship between all these taken together—the military, the civilian, the economic—and the political direction of the nation, its Congress, parliament, or other like authority

Furthermore, there are at least three important phases of this relationship.

One of them is the maintenance of preparedness in times of peace.

A second is that of entrance into war and the conduct of military operations.

A third is the equally important but often neglected peri-

od of demobilization—of the return of the soldier to civilian life—of the readjustment of the national economy to another phase of existence.

History is replete with material upon these interrelationships from the earliest days down to the present moment. The World War especially afforded illustrations of many phases of this problem. Blum, Lloyd George, Hindenburg, Churchill, Ludendorf, Huber, Pintschovius, and countless others have contributed their accounts and interpretations of the organization of military power at a time when democratic organization and economic structure and the tissue of propaganda were all closely involved and enmeshed as never before.

But in general the material is ill organized, little analyzed, and wide open to fresh interpretation and, above all, to imagination and invention of new types and forms of structure, procedure, process—new guiding principles and new modes of practical management.

If space permitted. I should be glad to outline in greater detail some of the specific questions involved in civil military relations in time of war. Indeed, I have done so in a discussion of democratic decisionism in another place.³⁴

The relationship between the brass hats and the frocks is a continuing one and affords many illustrations of the problem of reconciling in an action pattern the place of the expert technician and the place of the over-all director of policy. Years ago von Clausewitz, the founder of the modern art of war, recognized this problem of the interrelation of policy with military action, but his observations passed unnoticed by students of government generally.

In France, England, and Germany the relations between the army, the navy, the war office, and the parliament were of profound importance in the determination of military

strategy and effective national action. Lindsay Rogers maintains that the collapse of the German fighting-machine was due in great part to the lack of co-ordination between the civil and the military parts of the war organization. Lloyd George, in particular, emphasizes the necessity for repeated substitution of the civilian judgment for the military judgment at important moments of the conduct of the war. Of course, he does not contend that he was always wrong.

It is important to understand far better the general type and style of civil military organization for reasons of administration and political action and also in order that the community at large may know what to expect in times of military stress and storm. This, then, is one of the outstanding tasks of politics, especially in the day of democratic association and trend.

We wish to defend our way of life, and we will defend it; but we must therefore be fully prepared to examine the implications of the organization of violence in subordination to the organization of consent. This has never been done in the history of mankind thus far, but it must be done now. The French have made a near approach to it in practice, and the British in the late war. It is today the outstanding problem of the time, for it is a precondition to the pursuit of our life of reason and our association based upon reason.

We could, of course, fold our hands in America and yield to the first force that hints at taking our gold supply in Kentucky. Or we may hide our heads in the sand and deny that any danger can ever threaten great America, and declaim that we can be rich and free alone. There is ample precedent for saying: Am I my brother's keeper? But Hezekiah's gold, proudly displayed, went to Babylon.

Yet, this will not be our course, I predict. We will con-

struct a powerful organization, blending the skills of the military, the civilian, the industrial, and uniting the striking morale of the army forces with the persistence and drive of political leadership. We will demonstrate the ways and means of organizing violence and keeping it under the control of the will of the nation. In this it is essential to have the effective co-operation of the army, the navy, the air forces, the civilian administration, industry, labor, technology, and the benefit of expert advice and counsel from the organizers of management and the students of politics and political theory.

It is imperative in this process that we advance with due knowledge of all the factors involved. If it is important that civilians learn more about arms, it also is important that warriors learn more about, and do not forget, the aims and ways of democracy and liberty. Arms are a means to an end—a necessary and imperative end at times—but they are not the end itself. The ends are justice, liberty, the unfolding of the rich possibilities in human personality. We may organize our energies for war—for total war—but the goal is the organization of our forces for the free exercise of the noblest faculties of man.

II

THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT

THE organization of consent is the greatest problem of our day. It involves, first of all, an analysis of ideas and inventions, complex and puzzling in their nature. That governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed not only is the assertion of our Declaration of Independence but runs back to the fourteenth century, when this was the accepted doctrine of western Europe; and beyond that, back into the shadows of time, runs the recurring problem of the relations of governors to command and to obedience.¹

What is consent, and what is violence: and how are they to be distinguished? In the extreme cases it is not difficult to distinguish between robbery with a gun and a free market for exchange. But between these extremes there are many shades of color that blend into each other when we look more closely. Centuries of human experience have dealt with phases of this subject under the general heads of (1) private law and consent, (2) natural law, and (3) sovereignty.

Private lawyers and jurisprudentes have dealt with the problem of consent for centuries and with many wavering nuances between consent and nonconsent.² A contract may look simple, but it contains many possibilities of misinterpretation or invalidation. Was there contractual capacity; was there a meeting of the minds, and on what did they meet? Such problems have filled case records and fattened textbooks and pocket-books.³ Was the contract void or

voidable? I need not remind students in law libraries that what constitutes consent and coercion has attracted the interest of law students for a long time, in connection with one crime especially.

The natural-law philosophers dealt with the intricate refinements of the social contract in many imposing and illuminating tomes. It was Rousseau who once remarked that apparently a man had to be a philosopher before he could become a man, so complex were the engagements upon which he entered when he joined up with society, and so elaborately entwined were the implications of these engagements. They discussed how much was involved in consent; what was the span of consent; when is a contract voidable or void and under what conditions. I need not recite here the long series of ingenious speculations carried on by powerful and discriminating minds over a period of centuries.⁴

With the rise of modern nations came the modern sovereign in person and sovereignty in theory. But sovereignty, sooner or later, raised the double problem of supreme violence, on the one side, and mass consent, on the other. This challenged the construction of forms of government, of responsibility, and of public law for generations. It raised the problem of the scope and method of consent in myriad forms.

Bentham and the Utilitarians turned their attention away from the formal terms of the contracts to the motives and interests which prompted and sustained such relationships in society.⁵ In general, we may say, however, that emphasis continued upon the machinery *by which*, rather than the social situations or social psychology *through which*, command and obedience, coercion and co-operation, are conditioned.

In more recent times we turn again to the human material with which we deal, to social and individual psychology, and to a reanalysis of political behavior in terms broad enough to include both men and machinery. Between coercion and consent there are many intermediate stages that run into each other so subtly as to make distinctions difficult.⁶ There is the continuum including intimidation, threat, and fear. There is information, suggestion, persuasion, and duress.

There is consent on the rational level, on the nonrational level; there is consent that is legal and consent that is illegal; there is voluntary consent and involuntary consent; there is often consent without command—by imitation of another's behavior. A true picture of the process of consent would show the necessity of viewing coercion and consent from several different angles or dimensions, the combination of which indicated the point of action. There are configurations often of a very complex nature. There are wide ranges of varying capacity for, or concern with, consent in the field of government.

An unknown number of members of a political community want nothing more than to follow some form of leadership in which they have confidence—in general, if not in particular. When I returned to Berlin in 1937, after a five-year interval, the doorman at the Hotel Bristol said to me: "Oh, Herr Doktor, things are much better now [since the accession of Hitler]. When you were here before we were all the time troubled with meetings and parties and elections and things that must be settled or the country would be ruined. My wife and me, we had no peace: always troubles. Now we have time to think; now we are not worried about such things; now we can really enjoy ourselves." Here was a contented citizen, willing to abdi-

cate and allow someone else to take on the responsibilities of government. There are many such in many lands. (And perhaps all of us at some times.) They are not subjects primarily either of violence or of reason, for they have given a general blanket vote of approval to the conduct of affairs by the given government of the time, in return for what they call "peace."

What is involved in these situations goes far deeper down than surface phenomenon of consent or nonconsent, so flatly stated as that. What we come upon is the whole philosophy of obedience, the nature and area of voluntarism, the inner essence of social cohesion, basic principles of social psychology, leadership problems of the most complex character.⁷ Some of this material is old and well worn in discussion, but much of it is just emerging from the toils of observation and discussion, yet too immature for confident application.

What actually goes on in a command-obedience situation is not as simple as a relationship between A and B. There is a third party, in the shape of the society in which their interrelationship is set. Or, again, there is will involved, but there is also reason; there is interest calculated and uncalculated perhaps; there is symbolism and value judgment; there is faith, and there is fear. The decision may really be made by an event in ancient history, by a forgotten experience in childhood, by a spasticity of the colon, by heart or stomach trouble, by an overwhelming hope, by a sacrificial surrender.⁸ What are the conditions, we may ask, under which the equilibrium of consent arises and again is transformed?

Modern psychology—using that as a term to cover a multitude of related inquiries—is engaged in a determined struggle to discover what are the fundamental differentials

in human capacity.⁹ We students of government are concerned with following farther on to ascertain the more specific political differentials. Beyond that, how far and in what way are they trainable and modifiable; and beyond that, how are they related to the over-all framework of political behavior?

Before going on with a discussion of consent, however, we may note that in our time the whole doctrine of consent has been challenged by important groups of theorists and activists. Authoritarians are declaring that organized consent is unnecessary in any formal setting or form. Interpretation of the public interest by the leaders is a more adequate way of insuring the protection of the commonweal, they allege, and a more effective guaranty than the electoral machinery. Masses, it is held, are incapable of understanding what they want or need. This must be developed for them by authority. Much may be done *for* them, it is declared, but not *by* them. Voting and a "party" are retained, but only for purposes of propaganda.

The superiority of force is openly proclaimed as the alternative to the organization of consent. Acquiescence is demanded. Assent is measured by the size of enthusiasm of crowds gathering to greet the lords of earth and by the general alacrity of obedience. The rulers are responsible, each to one higher; and the highest is responsible only to the spirit of the race, as he sees it.¹⁰

Naziism, from this point of view, is not primarily a war against the Jews but a war against Christianity, and a war against rational determination of controverted questions in social affairs.

From one point of view the whole program of assaults upon intelligence and persuasion in common affairs, the glorification of force, the abandonment of human liberty and equality, the slavish worship of the

state, the despotic organization of power may be looked upon as an attack upon the whole Greco-Roman Western philosophy of life, not merely anti-Jewish but anti-Christian as well. The Greek regard for intelligence, the Roman regard for law and contract, the Christian respect for human personality, the medieval-feudal regard for the consent of the governed, even the absolutist entente between the altar and the throne—all these seem to be swallowed up in a doctrine of the superman and a gospel of power.¹¹

This is, in fact, a form of nihilism—a revolt against reason and a return to impulse and force.

Formal organizations of consent are covered in private law and in public law. But in the organization of consent as to personnel and policies there are guiding considerations applicable to a great variety of situations.

They fall under the following general heads: (1) understandings as to the types of action to which consent is normally required and as to emergencies in which more than the usual mandate will be given to government;¹² (2) means of organization: (a) streamlined authority and control and (b) free ways for free consideration of alternative policies. We may now consider these in turn.

1. If the commonweal is accepted as the end of the state, it may be said that any means adapted to this end are reasonable. But it may be said of this that anything might then be justified as legitimate pursuance of the commonweal.

The successful operation of any charter of government depends upon two factors:

a) There must be a general understanding as to the place of government in human institutions. It is in general understood that, in the family of power, government is one among several institutions—the family, the church, the industrial organization, the organization of learning, etc.—and that not all values and activities center in the political.

The state is one among several institutions—the agent for some social purposes but not for all, and conditioned by the skill with which it acts as the servant of general social purposes.

If the state becomes really totalitarian, except for emergency purposes in time of crisis, it meets with counter-difficulties. It becomes not an organ but all organs—a swollen and undifferentiated monolithic society, tending to return to differentiation in the end.

b) The general understanding as to the role of the state is further defined by the special culture pattern of the special time and place in which the state operates, and by the general understandings regarding that pattern in that special situation. When we look over the wide range of political behavior, we observe that, at one time or another, the political association has done almost everything, either in an emergency or habitually. What the government may do in primitive tribes, or in Russia, in England, in Turkey, in Germany, in the United States—these practices are widely different. But this does not mean that the customs are indefinite, as rulers have found, who from time to time stepped across the line of understandings and fell over the edge of the abyss—or were thrown. The undefined limitation is really a sort of *caveat emptor* for governors. The indescribable indefinite is a potential definite.¹³

In periods of rapid change it is, of course, far more difficult to know precisely what these understandings are than when a society stands still for generations. This is in great part the cause of our present-day confusion and malaise. We do not know what to take for granted. The ancient landmarks are being overturned now, not chiefly by men of ill will but by men of high intelligence and good will, by scientists and inventors, whose discoveries have

not been followed closely enough by peoples and governments.¹⁴

Emergencies in the life of the community have been from time immemorial the severest test of the process of consent. In situations where action is urgent, it is obvious that there cannot be any type of continuing formal consent. In fire, flood, famine, plague, battle, there must be instant action; and any consent must be established in general before, with the review of behavior after, the event. In the Roman system provision was made for dictators who for a period of six months carried on with emergency powers. Cincinnatus then returned to the plow—if he came back at all. Daladier is a more modern illustration.

In many jurisdictions, however, there is not a clear understanding as to what is to be given up in the emergency or as to the reasonable duration of a so-called "emergency." Superpatriots may cheerfully surrender too much; and malcontents, subzero patriots, may not be willing to give up enough. Our Revolutionary War was almost lost by the reluctance of the states to continue the necessary aid to the nation. On the other hand, aspiring leaders have often taken advantage of emergency powers to establish themselves in permanent control, as in the recent case of Germany and Hitler under emergency clauses of the Weimar Constitution.

Modern democracies have been sorely perplexed by crisis government for two principal reasons: (i) they were not willing to consider the degree and types of consent in war-time, because they did not believe in war, and they looked forward to a time when there would be an end of war; and (ii) they were unwilling to accord government wide-enough powers to deal with swift social change, because they thought of government as essentially negative in nature,

and specifically because industrial interests feared intervention in the process of industry.¹⁵ For these reasons democracies have been found unprepared at times and have been obliged to improvise attitudes and decisions which might better have been ready at hand.

Examples of misunderstanding in this area are seen in all countries. In our own national experience sincere but misguided persons denounced Andrew Jackson as "King Andrew," Abraham Lincoln as a "tyrant," Theodore Roosevelt as a "usurper," and Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a "dictator"—according to the verbal fashion of the hour.

I was with Colonel Roosevelt when he was shot in Milwaukee in 1912, and was present at the preliminary examination of Schrank, who fired the bullet. "I shot him," said Schrank, "because he was about to become a tyrant and overthrow our Constitution and our liberty. I read this in a newspaper."

The city-manager plan is, at times, denounced as dictatorship. Colonel Knox, of the *Chicago Daily News*, who denounced the national administrative management measure as dictatorship, was astounded to find his city-manager plan given the same label—and just as unreasonably.

Panics may often be prevented by preconsideration of the circumstances of emergencies. What normally happens in abnormality, we may ask? What happens in a storm, a fire, an earthquake? What are the indicia of crises, and what are the ways of dealing with these situations? In one sense emergencies cannot be foreseen; but there is an attitude of mind that marks the sophisticated and the stable, as compared with the opposite in experience and attitude. The fire drill in schools has its uses. In war the raw recruit under fire is a different man from the seasoned soldier who

has heard guns before and knows what to expect—when to flop down suddenly and when to smile. Political sophistication likewise brings a ready appraisal of political gunfire and the ability to know what can and should be done in a wide range of circumstances.

This is all the more important because many political attitudes and inventions arise during war emergencies. This has given the tone of command to the “political” for centuries, and only slowly are such attitudes modified to meet the demands of a consensual system.

2. What are the means of organization necessary in the process of consent? How shall we make sure that the role of the personalities who make up the community will be truly effective in determining the basic policy of the community when and as they wish? For this there are two basic essentials, in addition to an understanding as to the area within which community decisions will be made. These are: (a) streamlined authority and control; (b) free association and discussion of public policy, and choice of personnel in the electoral process.

a) Simplicity in lines of control requires types of structure and responsibility within the range of the electorate's probable interest and capacity. In our federal government the lines are relatively simple; but states, counties, and cities often retain what has been appropriately called the “jungle ballot.” In a community organized as is metropolitan Chicago, it is almost impossible for the voters to obtain control of the government at any one time. Our ballot was not planned to make popular control difficult, but it works that way in practice. Progress has been made in recent years, but much more remains to be done before we can say that the lines of consent to government in metropolitan Chicago are clear.

All this involves the broad process of control over strategic points, processes, and personnel from time to time. This is a source of wide confusion. We are for the consent of the governed; but, of course, we cannot elect policemen or officers in the army. The nonlogical conclusion is, then, that we can elect nothing, at no time, nowhere. I heard a high judge say recently that the substitution of an elected council instead of a mayor, as the highest authority in a city (the manager plan), was a betrayal of the consent of the governed! I have heard like arguments for the choice of weary arrays of county offices; and, on a larger scale, for a referendum upon war—in these days of 300-mile-an-hour bombers—plus.

That this strategy of popular control is difficult there is no doubt. But the alternative is still more difficult. It is that the despot, assuming his good intentions, must decide whether he serves the public for the common interest. He may be well intentioned, but he is a judge in his own cause.

One essential to the working of the organization of consent is the general appreciation of the role of legislative supervision and control of administrative management. All that the law can do is to lay down a set of guiding principles regarding a form of behavior. But these principles cannot merely be executed in the literal sense of the term. They must be applied, administered, and fitted into other laws and other administrative rulings and rules. No law-maker can possibly foresee the details of application of his law. This must be left to the group of administrators in whose hands rests, in large measure, the fate of the general rule.¹⁶ Those who make the law must, in a sense, foresee the management that goes with the law; they must consent to its application by those charged with this responsibility. But it is a frequent experience that those who consent to

the rule do not consent to its application, chiefly because they are not familiar with the implications of lawmaking.

The Eighteenth Amendment was a notable example of the gap between willingness to declare a policy and unwillingness to administer the declared policy. What is sometimes called "hortatory" or advisory legislation imposes a heavy burden on administration. A lack of practical judgment at this point may lead either to the hasty enactment of an impossible law or to the unnecessarily slack enforcement and application of eminently sensible and practicable rules of action. General consent, then, implies and involves on the part of the concurrent majority a delicate appreciation of the relationship between lawmaking and administrative management, and of the balance to be held between them.

An essential to continuous control over government is the provision for change in constitutional or fundamental organization of the commonwealth.¹⁷ One generation cannot be presumed to control another in the fundamentals of political order. We have not the power to bind our successors to the continuance of our ideas as to the organization and powers of government; if we attempt it, they disregard us.

This may seem elementary, but it can readily be forgotten that one of the basic principles of government based on the consent of the governed is that of the continuing opportunity for change. In the system of the United States this is one of the outstanding and typical Americanisms. Those who are opposed to any change in American government, at any time, in any way, forget the principles upon which democratic government is founded. An unchangeable government would be an un-American government. The price of our continuing freedom is freedom to

change. Nothing could be more undemocratic in general or more un-American in particular than a system which would deny the community the right to determine its own form of government. This would mean control by the minority over the majority.

b) Opportunity for free association and discussion is, in democratic countries, a matter of right; but the process requires constant encouragement and development. It was Bentham who declared that the liberty of a people is proportional to the opportunity for free criticism of government and free association for opposition to it.¹⁵

Most of the time in the history of the human race there has not been freedom of open criticism of the ruling powers, and there is not much today, for that matter.¹⁹ If we run over the pages of a volume like that of McLeod on the *Origin and History of Politics*, we find only here and there a spot where there was even a semblance of liberty of thought regarding affairs of state. Criticism was not only illegal but immoral—an evidence of a distorted mind—a testimony to a twisted personality. In Homer's *Iliad*, when a disturber raised a question, he was smitten on the mouth and everyone laughed without restraint.

Yet this silencing of criticism never can be as effective as it seems. Within the circle of the rulers there is room for criticism by those who are rated as qualified to judge. Everywhere there is a buzzing and babbling of tongues that defies legal restraint even by the most despotic despot. The "poverty of power"²⁰ defies the efforts of the powerful to hold criticism completely in check. Dissent bursts forth where and when least expected. Wisdom came sometimes from the king's jester even, the only one who dared to speak the truth—in jest. Was it a crime to smile at his jokes, or not to smile? Dissent may lead on to dissension.

In a community undertaking to organize general consent to government it is imperative that the channels of communication be kept wide open. Four obstacles, among others, arise to prevent a sound decision. They are: ignorance (casual or constitutional), bad judgment (irrationality), personal interest deflecting judgment, and indifference (insensitivity). The effect of general discussion is to break the force of these obstructions in many instances, although not, of course, in all. Capacity for such consideration of problems of the commonweal may be acquired in the schools and maintained by the open way of free discussion of persons and principles and policies.

I do not presume to solve this problem of intellectual intercommunication—one of the most momentous in the experience of human personality. Free discussion will organize itself if allowed the open way of association and expression. Even in despotic areas criticism lifts its head, while in free communities general participation finds its way throughout the range of common activities in the state.

We may now raise the question: What has been added, as time has gone on, to our knowledge of the underlying problems of consent? What additions to knowledge are being evolved for our consideration and application? Several important factors may be noted.

1. The retreat from the older systems of caste and status, and the advance to social organizations which recognize in one form or another, however tentatively, the dignity of mankind, has very greatly intensified the meaning of consent by placing emphasis on voluntarism, on liberty in human relations. This makes a web far more complex than in the days of custom, where authority was not so readily or so often challenged.

2. The consensual idea has been intensively developed

through the private-law theory and practice of contract; through the extended discussions of natural law in the field of constitutional and international law; and, in later years, through the sociology of law and jurisprudence.

It was learned by the end of the fourteenth century that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed; that what concerns the community and the commonweal is the affair of the community taken as a whole. In an effort to carry this principle into effect we have traveled a long road—a steep and often, indeed, a bloody road—to establish public law, in place of private law, as the basis of the state; to establish the *Rechtsstaat* in place of the *Machtstaat*; to repudiate irresponsibility and to establish the practice of responsible government; to set up a system of universal franchise as a form of consent.

Experiments have been made, then, with the operational aspects of organized consent. These have, however, been limited to but a few states and with only imperfect organization of the generality of the community. Some of the “organizations of consent,” so called, were only thinly disguised oligarchies or dictatorships; and even the best of them were strongly colored by social aristocracy. From these experiments we have learned much, but we still have much to learn.

3. We have learned the guiding principles just enumerated and briefly discussed, some of which seem simple in theory but are far-reaching when put in practice. (a) The necessity of understandings as to the area of community decision; (b) the necessity of simple lines of authority and its control; (c) allowance for emergencies; (d) the nature of administrative management in relation to legislative control; (e) the necessity of opportunity for free association and discussion of policies of state; (f) the dan-

gers of worshiping special forms of consent as sacred and not subject to change; and (g) the importance of intimate relation between social intelligence and general consent.

4. The study of scientific management, which at first tended to regard the worker as a mere machine, has in its later phases of the study of management tended to consider the worker not merely as an object of command but as a part of the total situation; to study his receptivity, as well as his orders; and to consider leadership as something other than dominance. The political implications of this are important.²¹ Modern inquiries and analysis have repudiated the old master-slave relation as a permanent and necessary phase of human interrelationship, finding it a survival of vested interests rather than a construct of creative evolution.

We are in process of learning from the psychologists (social and individual), from the psychiatrists and the medical men, from the geneticists and the environmentalists, from the students of industrial and administrative management, from the students of leadership, about the patterns of behavior that underlie even the simplest structure and condition the meaning of formal organization and action. When these data are established and the generalizations deducible are deduced and when we learn how far and in what manner these capacities and potentialities are susceptible of modification, retraining, and reconditioning, we shall then be in a position to adapt the patterns of consent and command to the desire and capacity of the ultimate consumer. We know now that we are dealing with very great oversimplifications of political phenomena and that the emerging patterns will be intricate and complex, with more than one dimension necessary for their delineation.

In the meantime the philosophers and ethicists may be more nearly agreed upon what is the chief end of man, politically, and the ideals to be pursued in reaching this goal.

For myself, on the basis of what I now know:

1. I repudiate the general validity of the master-slave relationship and its permanence in human institutions—and that alike on the ethical, the legal, the industrial, and the political basis.

2. I assert the values of general consent as a principle of rule over the affairs of the commonwealth, as over against the system of individual and irresponsible interpretation.

3. I maintain that men should be treated as personalities, on a fraternal basis, and that they be included in the range of consent of the governed as a part of the governing process.

4. I maintain the values of leadership based upon consent and co-operation, as against dominance imposed in large measure by violence, as a conclusion indicated by political, industrial, and social considerations.

5. I emphasize the importance of continuous scrutiny of the organization of consent, with a view to readjustments and adaptations essential to the end of securing government in the interest of the common good and in the best relation to social intelligence.

Many important questions will be raised in the near future regarding the most appropriate forms of consent. I enumerate a few of them not for judgment on my part at this time but for an exploratory review of types of challenge and controversy that may be heard in the course of the coming generation.

1. Time will not permit, nor is this the occasion for, a discussion of the role of representative bodies in the or-

ganization of consent, either on a theoretical or on an operational basis; or with reference to their social composition, their methods of choice, their *modus operandi*, the best ways and means of obtaining the verdict of social intelligence through discussion, or the relations of representative bodies to other branches of government. These agencies are under severe attack at the present time, upon charges of incapacity and inefficiency in arriving promptly at decisions or, in the longer run, of shaping broad policies of national concern. I may merely say in passing that, when councils go out of the front door, they are likely to come in at the rear entrance. A secret parliament takes the place of the public parliament. A despot does not act alone—unless he is mad—and then not for long. He is surrounded by deputies from here, there, and everywhere. Only his counselors are not always known—and, more than that, they are not responsible to the commonwealth at large.

2. What is the future unit or basis of the legislative body: territorial, occupational, functional; unicameral, bicameral, tricameral; large or small; local, intermediate, or national?²²

3. What is the future of representative bodies in the organization of discussion? Will the new uses of the radio revive general discussion, if not face to face (without television) at least mouth to ear? Will it tend to outdate or revive the discussion of the council chamber? Will the opportunity for direct mass appeal operate to the advantage of the representative bodies, or will it be turned to the uses of dictatorial propaganda? Here is a major problem of the emerging future.²³

4. What is the relation of the sampling polls to discussion and consent? From one point of view these samples

may result in snap decisions without particular discussion and may assume at once an authoritative position not based upon much reflection. Sample polls might thus obstruct, rather than aid, the process of orderly and mature consideration of political problems. On the whole, they have been very helpful thus far, but their ultimate effects are in doubt.

5. How shall we recruit the highest competence for legislative service? How shall we contrive to compensate lawmakers for the loss of the most valuable years of their lives in legislative service? Should pensions be granted to those who have served a minimum period? There is much to be said for this proposal—so much that I recommend the procedure in principle if it is desired to make the occupation of lawmaker attractive. Provision for legislative pensions has already been made in New York State and is working satisfactorily there in its special form.²¹

6. Should the voting-age, the age of suffrage, be changed in view of the changing age-grouping going on in the community? Should the voting-age be set at eighteen, for example, on the theory that youth might well assume its share of political responsibility at an earlier age? Is there anything sacred or sound about the number twenty-one, or some compelling reason why it should be maintained?²²

7. What is the future role of the party system in the organization of consent? It has long served and still serves a very useful purpose, but it stands in need of thorough revision at two particular and important points. What are they?

a) One is the final elimination of the burden of the spoils system, which, in spite of its popular repudiation, time after time, still hangs like a millstone around the neck of the parties in the United States.

b) As to the organization of party intelligence, party principle, and party program through party conference and discussion, I indicated lines upon which this might be done in 1923, and I now second my own motion.²⁶

8. The relative values of the parliamentary and the presidential or executive system still remain experimental. But it is increasingly difficult to avoid the conclusion that the position of the executive in modern government is likely to follow the lines of the executive leadership in the social pattern generally. This involves the emergence of the presidential type established in the American Constitution, but the whole wide-ranging problem is on the boards for thorough discussion.

9. It may be pointed out, in passing, that the problem of governments is duplicated in the problem of the organization of consent in a modern corporation, where the older stockholder-director relationship does not work as well as it was once hoped. The owner, the management, the consumer, the producer, the employees—all are involved in a very complex and, in many places, unsatisfactory relationship for either command or consent. This situation is likely to be the center of emerging theory and practical experiment.

10. The whole problem of the relation of the expert and the layman in governmental affairs, their respective competences and roles, is involved in the determination of types, forms, and processes of political consent.²⁷ The expert, the ultimate consumer, and the broker are all inter-related in the complex process of government. Incidentally, in business and other social relationships where the mediation of management is required and accepted, a like problem exists. How can we make sure that the will of the community (group) and the wisdom of the community

(group) are effectively conjoined in the process of general consent, so that the force of will, the cutting-edge of intelligence, and human morale are alike utilized in a final result?

It is with problems such as these that the genius of the coming generation will find itself concerned. For consent is not a fixed master-plan but a continuing process. It is an idea, not a mechanism; an attitude, not a law.

III

THE IDEAL STATE

IT IS not my purpose to add to the long list of the world's utopias, the latest of which H. G. Wells has just set out.¹ I have perused many of them—Plato, Harrington, Campanella, More, and on down to the very suggestive series by Haldane and others²—sometimes with pleasure and sometimes with pain, and sometimes, I may admit, with bored indifference. Most of them are not ideal states but ideal societies, with only very crude references to the organization of government. Plato's *Republic* was an exception to this. And many, indeed, show very little imagination even in the field of social affairs. Many of the writers tend to be tender hearted rather than tough minded.

In one sense the ideal state is that which best carries out the purposes of the community, whatever they may happen to be at a particular time. From this point of view we might consider the ideal government in hell or the ideal government in heaven—the ideal government in a university perhaps in between—or the government of illegal groups: pirates, thieves, and underworld. Given the ends of the society, we may ask: What is the ideal organization of the state? It has already been conceded that there are other values than the political, values perhaps higher in rank in human estimation and purpose.

Yet in a sense the political is itself also a human value in the general scheme of values, and *pro tanto* not wholly an instrument of other values. The political is not wholly neu-

tral and instrumental but is of itself an expression of human personality. The political per se is a part of the total situation with which we must reckon.

The political has its own ideal ends to be considered and attained, if possible.³ Order, justice, integration, equilibrium, security, the commonweal—these are desiderata in human life and have a rank in the scale of human values. They are the special responsibility of the statesmen, to whom they appear as significant life-values. If we are to attempt the task of setting up an ideal state, we assume them as standard values of a standard society we hope to serve.

It would be possible to examine in detail a great variety of structures and processes designed to carry out the chief purposes of a political society. The usefulness of such a procedure I should not deny, but I propose rather to determine in first instance the guiding lines upon which the ideal government might be projected in the emerging future. Accordingly, I have (1) analyzed the problem and then (2) set down various guiding considerations and elaborated them as the principal part of this discussion—obviously a brief one. After this treatment of guiding considerations I have (3) set down a few of the larger points sought in an ideal political association.

I. THE ELEMENTS OF THE EMERGING PROBLEM

“Where are we now?” it may be asked. In a period such as our own, what is the underlying condition of our malaise and unbalance? In a world as highly cultivated as ours, what has caused so tragic an unrest? What are the underlying elements of discord and the factors conducive to unity?

Our modern problem is not merely that vital and im-

pressive value systems spring up in various parts of our world but that we are not yet intelligent and active enough to organize some mutual interrelationship in which all of these values might have a field for free growth, after their own special type, with full opportunity to experiment after their own model. The elements of controversy are found chiefly in the opposition of (1) the economic versus the political values and institutions; (2) the traditionalized economic-political-social versus the scientific attitude; (3) the lack of rapport between the ethical-religious and the others—for example, the political-economic-scientific; and (4) the territorial-ethnic complexes and their clashing demands.

To some the road to solution seems very simple indeed. March the army forth and establish with blood and iron a new regime, in which unity of purpose is forcibly achieved. Organize the class war and, by one means or another, peaceful or otherwise, end what is loosely called "capitalism." Establish a state of affairs in which the cross will become the guide and warden of social behavior at such points as it may select for regulation, admonition, or other manipulation. Select a board of scientists and let them rule the affairs of the world in their scientific spirit.

It is unrealistic to assume that any of these solutions will be widely enough accepted to provide a pattern of power, of institutions, or of values that would meet the problem of the present day. Indeed, the proponents of these alternative plans are actively at odds with each other about national, class, racial, ecclesiastical interest, and ways of life.⁴

Nor is it probable that any such set of suggestions will be generally adopted. But alternative schemes may usefully be developed for consideration, and divers elements of the common problem may be analyzed and discussed in their

general bearings. Closer attention to the inner problems of management and control will inevitably have an important bearing on the relations of groups unable to compose their broader differences. The enemy is less an enemy when we look closely at his intimate techniques of organization and aggressiveness—perhaps the friend, too, by reverse logic.

In considering more in detail the synthesis of values, I have no illusions as to my ability to develop a specific that will cure all the ills that all the bodies politic, economic, ecclesiastical, are heir to. My role is the more modest one of analyzing a problem in the hope of putting it in the way of a more intelligent solution in the long run—not too long.

Does any one of these value groups really wish to assume full responsibility for the governance of all affairs in a unified system? Probably not, for it is a general characteristic to desire power without responsibility—to expand authority without assuming all of the burdens of wearing the crown and the accompanying uneasiness of crown-wearers.

Possibly the Soviets, or the Japanese, or Rome, or Germania might care to take over the world and organize and administer it. But there is little evidence that any of them has thought that far, at least in any detail—except in moments when the imagination soared to dream- or dope-flights untrammelled by the stern realities of the practical.⁵

Certainly the church does not desire the secular sword, but only to have its services conveniently at hand when the higher suasion has failed or requires a supplement.⁶ Business does not wish to control all phases of government at all times, but only to have it ready for service when the button is pressed. Most nations have troubles at home and would welcome the establishment of a world-order in which they might carry on their enterprises undisturbed by the

competition in armament, and especially the establishment of peace within their own borders.

The soviets speak the language of world-revolution and world-rule but stammer somewhat in their speech, and surely they have not attained to the level of the grammar of politics down to this time, or even to an economy of abundance at home. Their assumption of responsibility for the organization of the interests of the world is remote; indeed, there is no certainty that even the communistic economics, if it became general, might not take on the nationalistic form such as Russia now indicates in her own organization of politics.

From the national point of view, a long period of preparation for world-order is required before the necessary co-ordination of interests, habituation to larger areas of jurisdiction and control, and the interpenetration of value systems can take place and develop the basis for new forms of association and new symbolisms of authority and association. The League of Nations was a step in this direction, but it has been able to make progress only at a snail's pace—not fast enough, indeed, to keep up with the growing feelings of unrest and the rise of warlike emotions.

Any international association involves more than machinery and more than a conciliation of competing interests. It imperatively demands the slower and more creative development of values of an international order—of the symbolism and sets of association by and through which the masses of people may turn automatically to the larger unit for the adjudication of types of difficulties for which they now demand automatically the clash of arms and the shedding of blood. Madariaga says: "The work involves the conquering of ancient passions fostered in and for another age, but still vigorous in our own times despite

the changes in environment which make them obsolete and out of harmony with contemporary life.”

In simplest form the competing value systems center around, let us say, government, which we may call “steel”; business, which we may call “gold”; religion, which we may call “the cross”; and science, which we may call “reason.” Government has been generally recognized as the special custodian of justice and order; industry, of commodity production; and religion, as the mother of idealism and sacrificial impulses.

But the traditional methods and values of none of these are strong enough to weave the web of unity which is demanded by the spirit of the time, to achieve at once industrial and spiritual security. Government and industry have both claimed liberty; science and industry have claimed initiative; government and religion have both claimed faith and idealism. Mores, religion, and conscious social control have all contributed to the regulation of human behavior in one form and another. It goes without saying that their concerted operation contributes greatly to the unity of order in a given society, provided, of course, it does not destroy the elements of variation which are so precious a possession of a developing society—provided, again, that development is deemed an advantage rather than stratification.

How then, it may be asked, shall such an integration of authority be brought about or facilitated in modern times? What are the next steps or stages in the process?

The most powerful force working in the direction of conciliation of value systems is that of technology or science in last analysis. The blending of the values of tradition and science has gone forward; and, while still separated by a wide gap, the appreciation of scientific values is generally

recognized wherever the machine reaches. It is in the conciliation of traditional values with new types of social invention that difficulty arises constantly. The old township or school district resists the new organization made necessary by the automobile; but those who smile at this anachronism become very serious when the expansion of equally outdated national powers is suggested, and belligerent when the possibility of world-order is brought forward. The free development of science is recognized as a great contributing factor to national development, but the fettering of the schools may not be recognized as a move in precisely the opposite direction. The machine-minded may not be socially machine minded, and may perhaps turn the full force of one against the other with confusion worse confounded in the realm of social reorganization.

This case is further complicated when it happens that the traditional values and their perpetuation are more profitable to minority interests than readjustment, however clearly indicated by the analysis of the social situation. It is equally true that the most stubborn resistance is encountered in the territorial domain and in the relations between economic and political sets of interests and relations, and particularly in the combination of these sets of perplexities, as when the Russian nation becomes the center of one system and the Western nations the center of another, so that a class-communistic system (national in range) is placed against a nationalistic-capitalistic system. Science is employed to strengthen the equipment and defend the differences of both.

The territorial nationalistic systems have yielded, it is true, to the extent of developing forms of international arbitration and conciliation and to the organization of the League of Nations, but the functioning of these institu-

tions is far from adequate to the attainment of what might be termed a working arrangement. Progress had also been made in the direction of a modification of the economic-political system on bases more nearly adapted to the changing conditions of modern life; but, as in the case of international relations, nothing approaching a rapport has yet been attained on a large scale.

We face then (1) the separation of church and state, (2) the antagonism of nation and nation, and (3) a gulf between government and industry. And this in a world which grows more and more intimate in its relations, more compact territorially and more intimate intellectually, more intimate morally and culturally. As isolation tends to disappear, rapport retreats, so that the new pattern becomes paradoxically one of greater proximity and less friendliness!

Yet, even under these conditions, levels of concurrence are established here and there. Within very large territorial units there are areas of agreement in time of war or in great emergency, when the general tension unites all or almost all elements; and there are grooves of international agreement which are not obstructed by emotion, such as the postal agreement.

Meanwhile the totalitarian state, the ruler *urbis et orbis*, and the world-revolution of the proletariat rage around the world in their efforts to encircle and envelop each other. Order and Justice, Liberty, Faith, Initiative, and Science remain unreconciled, or even in violent controversy, seeking in vain for a rapprochement.

What are the elements of a synthesis of values in the modern world adequate to serve as a basis for institutions and for the adequate organization of human behavior? The problem is, briefly stated: (1) to provide for universal and progressive participation in the gains of civilization;

(2) on an accepted basis of intervaluation of services; (3) in a framework of security, justice, and order, in which initiative, creation, and adventure have their area of operation.

An emerging form of association must deal with the material wants of men and also with their other aspirations not yet satisfied; it must provide security and adventure; it must deal with men's emotions, their intelligence, their faith in the future, and must unify existing conflicts in interpretation of these values.

Modern men will not be satisfied with the explanations of divine right, or with brute force, or with larger productivity alone, or with a stoic indifference that excludes all values by minimizing them.

II. EIGHT GUIDING CONSIDERATIONS

A system of guiding considerations for the ideal state will be something like this:

1. General spirit—utopian both in the scientific sense and in the religious sense. It is essential to paint the scientific picture of an attainable future in verifiable terms, showing what the gains of political civilization are and are likely to be, and holding out this definite hope to men. This will also show the meaning of faith "as the evidence of things hoped for, the substance of things not seen"—the significance of types of aspirations which enter into the lives of men at all times and which constitute a permanent part of their equipment.

The prospects of the emerging civilization can be indicated for the world at large or for individual states. What are the obstacles to human advance and what are the possibilities of progress is the question that might be at least approximately answered. The analysis of the world's resources and the possibility of developing them, the analysis

of the world's income and its distribution, would at least provide a factual basis for further consideration by the respective nations of the world.⁸ Who owns the world? What is the criterion of wealth and consumption distribution? What are the stakes of nations and of culture groups?

What values are most valuable, it may be asked, when measurements fail to give statistical answers?

2. Recognition of authority as essentially trusteeship rather than ownership. In the religious field, in most of the political fields, and in science this is already recognized; and men are agents, trustees, and servants rather than masters or lords. In the economic field the full implications of this have not been realized, however, as landlords and other lords often think of themselves as independent sovereigns, treating with political and other servants perhaps.

3. Recognition of the institutionalizing of trusteeship. In the political world responsibility in general was conceded long before responsibility in particular was set up in the form of the *Rechtsstaat* and of responsible government. In other areas the general principle is admitted, but the practical application resisted, as when employers resist collective bargaining by their employees or of control by the state itself—asserting the priority of their own interpretation of their interests; or when states resist world-order. Industrial autocracy, however, is not consistent with an emerging principle of authority and finds itself swept to one side either by the force of the Communist or the counterforce of the Fascist or Nazi.

The principle of master and man is no longer applicable in the form and with the implications of mastership historically. There will, of course, be leadership and direction, but based upon another principle and in another setting of institutions.

4. Recognition of the new value of expert management and its place in the social scheme, alongside the older values of adjudication and common counsel. This is "administration," whether in government, industry, industry-government, or in religion. Management was long organized in the church—and that not upon a hereditary basis; it was the basis of modern efficiency in government, developing under the absolutists but continued by the democracies; and in industry management rapidly tends to supersede the other factors in successful operation of an enterprise. Management may become, and often tends to become, bureaucracy, but is, nonetheless, an essential element in association and requires wide recognition of its function in the body politic, economic, cultural. It is the great lubricator of human relations. But management is no longer merely personal patronage; it is based on the dignity of man and on the scientific values of human treatment. It is not merely humane: it is scientific.

5. Recognition of the role of science, education, planning in the development of any system—of whatever external type, as truly in Japan as in Russia or America. Science is intelligence in human affairs and must enter into any emerging pattern of values and institutions. Tradition may stand in the way of intelligence and often has, and the denial has lost many a battle and ruined empires. But traditions that cannot stand the irreverent analysis of science are foredoomed, and their day of departure may be postponed but not prevented in the long run.⁹

Beating the tom-toms may arouse the fighting spirit of the group, but the drum itself and the weapons of war are devised by the technicians. Even more, as the study of propaganda develops, may the scientist also be called in to

aid in the "making medicine" which is thought essential to preparation for war.

This cannot be said to have penetrated through the general attitude toward authority in social affairs, for there still remains a domain into which science is not welcomed—in dealing with governmental and industrial concerns. Science may be utilized as servant and as tool, but not as an equal. Science may be thought useful for industrial chemistry, for example, or for war explosives, but not in shaping the conditions which might make war unnecessary or industrial disturbance less frequent. Moral values may be conjured up against Galileo, or against Darwin, or against dissection of the dead, or against vaccination, or against birth control or sterilization, or even against an amendment to a constitution or against a form of tax, which may be found "immoral." Or science itself may, in social affairs, become unscientific through the attitudes and expressions of leaders such as Millikan and Carrel,¹⁰ who at times speak the language of social reaction in the name of science.

In an emerging type of state it will be found indispensable to recognize and foster the enormous values of science in the development of resources and also in the organization of social devices for better utilization of natural—and human—resources. It is important that statesmen and scientists be at least on speaking terms in peace as well as in war.

In like manner the role of education may well be made a part of emerging forms of association if it is desired to set up a unified system recognizing the elements of which modern civilization is made up. By "education" is meant, however, not merely an official system of propaganda but the systematic training of the human mind and emotions,

the development of opportunities for continuing human growth and appreciation. If it be said that all modern systems recognize the values of education and act accordingly, my reply is that educational systems often fall short at precisely the points where they should be opened out—that they restrict education to special sets of values and ignore or prohibit the introduction of others, either directly or by indirection through emphasis and distortion. The great bulk of the modern national systems are now closed systems, excluding from consideration the various forms of values which are essential to the newly emerging type of association appropriate to the newly emerging world.¹¹

There can be little doubt that, when education and medicine do their perfect work and produce stabilized personalities of a balanced type, the task of governance will be far lighter than it has been traditionally in the history of mankind. Much of the political sorrow of the world is caused by frustrated personalities, by maladjusted rebels and reactionaries, by those who never grew up or grew up wrong, whose intelligence and emotions were not trained to get along with each other or with other persons. It is true that "Adolph Hitler had a mother; and Mussolini had a ma." But were they adequately brought up in the way they should go?

Wide ranges of trouble may be avoided with sounder systems of early training, preventing the growth of the large numbers of twisted and unhappy souls from whom are recruited the armies of crime, low and high, and of disorder and demagoguery.¹²

This may seem more utopian than the old utopias, but I stand by it and am more certain of this point than of any others in this discussion. This was the pet theme of my *Civic Education in the United States*—to which no one paid

any attention. I proposed a psychiatrist on the Social Studies Commission but was drowned in inextinguishable laughter—which only added, however, to my inextinguishable determination.¹³

I am not saying that all this will be done in the near future. On the contrary, it seems more probable that existing systems will close their eyes and ears even more completely than before and, ostrich-like, hide their heads in the sand. But in the long run change will come by the inexorable force of the interpenetration of ideas, possibly with dangerous results under all the circumstances. What I am doing here is outlining the conditions favorable to a new order of values in an emerging world—not predicting the immediate action of those who are so drunk with power or hysterical with fear that their action runs along the non-rational planes.

6. Pluralism of values. There will be an incorporation of older value systems in the new system. It is important to observe the shading of the permanent over into the new and changing, the transitions which distinguish between the old which is outworn and the old which is important in the new. Revolutions that change too much retreat and take up what they abandoned too hastily,¹⁴ having more faith in the intelligence that made the sword than in the same intelligence that might show them how to use it and where; more faith in bombs than in the intelligence that made the bomb; more faith in airplanes than in the mind that made the plane.

In a revolutionary spirit it is possible to root out religion; it is possible to root out private property; it is possible to root out democracy—or monarchy, for that matter; it is possible to root out the Jews or other groups disliked; to make a crackling bonfire of the tenderest values and burn

them with a jubilee of rejoicing. Of course, if necessary change is to be brought about only by violence, something must be allowed to the pattern of violence, something of brutality and savagery, since this is the type of change. But far beyond that the hand of violence may reach to attempt the permanent destruction of priceless assets of long-cultivated value systems.

There is nothing in recent social trends to indicate that we are likely to blot out religion, or all privacy of property, or special races, from the earth and set up systems without them. The Jews have wandered long; the church has flourished under persecution—more than in prosperity even; some form of privacy of possession clings even to the most completely communized form of life, in the cell of the monk, in the home of the commissar.

These comments, I may say, are not presented as a counsel of perfection but, on the contrary, as a mandate of survival in a world of struggling forces and competing values—as a realistic conclusion based upon observation of the difficulties of wholesale destruction of critical and opposing values by builders of authority.

In most wars the enemy survives the peace treaty and remains to be dealt with for a long time—even if his flag never flies again, or for a long time. And, of course, given sufficient difference in strength the enemy may be destroyed or permanently disabled, as in the case of some local tribe or faction.

The recurring problem of all power is to remind itself of its own limitations and functions—and this is as true of spiritual authority as of secular. Born in moments of great tension and carrying the weapons of destruction in hand, the tendency of power is to perpetuate the moment of its origin; to forget the world into which it comes and in which

it must live—to forget that the essence of power is creation, not destruction, is trusteeship, not mastery, leadership, not exploitation. “He that will be first among you, let him become a servant,” is a precept of general value in political as well as in ethical affairs. I confidently predict that the new value systems, as they emerge from the chaos and defeatism of our day, will include many of the older values developed in experience, among them religious values, chief among the centers of emotional and artistic unification.

The ideal government cannot limit itself to its narrower juristic aspects, important as they have been and will doubtless continue to be. The new government must make a partner of science, a partner of industry, a partner of religion in the best sense of the term. Religion may well abdicate some of its political implications¹⁵ and unite more closely with science and with government, as well as with art, in the elaboration of types of human behavior on the idealistic side,¹⁶ while the values of industry may be more closely associated with those of government in the new sense of the term. Industry cannot boycott the state indefinitely.¹⁷

It is not merely the distribution of the mineral resources of the world, or the horsepower of the world, or the racial differentials of the world, or the title to what is called “property” in the world, or credits or gold, or the territorial boundaries called “states,” that prevents the equitable and acceptable reorganization of interests and institutions—important as all these are—but the antagonism of value systems which run down below the obvious surface of the world.

There are possible unifications of value systems, of material interests, so called, of institutions of “steel,” “gold,” and “the cross,” which may be identified running through

all these crisscross patterns, if there is the intelligence and the will to weld them into a new form and weave them into a new set of values and symbolisms.¹⁸

7. Emphasize co-operation rather than coercion. In the emerging system of political association, the dominant factor will not be violence and war, although this may be the way to its establishment. It may well be, as Machiavelli suggested, that the prophets who are armed survive those who are not armed, but the instrument of their continuance is co-operation rather than continued force.

Violence is a confession of the lack of power—of weakness rather than strength—in nations as in families. Sparring the rod is no longer considered an evidence of feebleness, but of strength—in the family, in the school, in the factory, even in the army itself.¹⁹

The techniques of industry, of the church, of education, of science—the principal techniques contributing to the happiness of mankind—are all averse to the use of brutal force; and the trends of modern civilization point irresistibly in this general direction, however loudly the whips may crack at any given moment even now.

The type of the ideal form of political association is not that of an armed camp of a state, patrolled by unending groups of military or police, with scope and method of obedience fixed by the captain of the troop and enforced by the sergeant. The world will be Athens rather than Sparta, it may be safely predicted—or, if unsafely, even so.

Co-operation does not signify the absence of order, hierarchy, discipline, leadership—all of which may flourish in its domain—but signifies relatively light emphasis on brute force and relatively heavy emphasis on the attractive forces of the community—the use of less force and

more flowers—of the *miranda* of politics rather than its *horrenda*.²⁰

Co-operation involves the closer study of the conditions of human activity and the scientific and human efforts to adapt the conditions of production and consumption to the needs of those who utilize them or are parts of them. It presupposes an educational system pointed up to this purpose and a continuing study of working and living conditions in a world of swift change, adapted to this goal. To the extent that this is not done or is not possible, violence is employed and breakdowns occur.

But precisely here it may be indicated that the tension points in our complex modern civilization are to be repaired by medicine and education rather than by violence. If the form of association called "government" insists upon its sword too long or too widely, it will be relegated to the position now occupied by the whip in the school, in the family, and in the factory—and its functions of social mediation and control will be taken over by others better adapted to the needs of the new time. Scientists, priests, teachers, and managers will be found in greater demand than generals.²¹

Co-operation will not come because men are soft and fearful of war but because they are hard and can face the tough realities of modern existence, and are patient enough to seek for solutions in other than angry moods. It will not lack discipline, but discipline will be based upon reasonable understanding and assent and will be directed toward an agreed end. Hate, fear, and force are controllable impulses, not to remain the masters of human fate. I do not proclaim their immediate exit from human affairs but only indicate the inexorable trend toward their controlled existence.

8. Recognize the creative as well as the control roles of association. This is a hard saying for some who see in political association only a negative thing—who see only repression, command, and restriction. Is not this the essence of all authority, from the Ten Commandments on down? What else is authority, if not this? Who likes to be commanded, and who loves to be repressed?

The new state, however, may well rest upon another basis than this and build upon the creative function of association, political and otherwise.²² The jurists and the soldiers, and sometimes indeed the priests, have led us far away from a genuine understanding of the true uses of government and social organization. When Lorenzo de Medici approached the Pope, wearing his cardinal's hat but with his shirt rolled back to show his armor underneath, the Pope said: "If you are not careful, I may take that hat from your head." To which Lorenzo replied: "I would look better with a steel hat anyway."²³

The true design of authority is not that of destruction but of creation. Theology, itself, in its later forms proclaims God as love rather than as fear, as an attractive force rather than as a point of fear and terror. The king was once the father of his people, not their dictator; creator rather than master. It was only later that kings began to think of themselves as masters or even as gods, with all the powers of gods but not their responsibilities for rule. Caligula had himself worshiped not as a creator but as a despot. Even the proprietary position of the patrimonial ruler who spoke of "my lands and my people," assumed, in pronouncing the word "my," a form of responsibility, however remote its possibilities of enforcement.

The absolutistic nationalists, however, and later the invisible employers, alike developed the idea of authority as

a thing per se—not a godlike responsibility but a personal possession, without responsibility however for its care and maintenance. The conception of the police as a repressive power and of the industrial master as irresponsible for the welfare of his dependents alike contributed to the widespread dislike of authority and its identification with an alien and unfriendly force, constantly pressing against one's interests.

The industrialist himself was caught often in the same net and came to look upon regulation as essentially negative in nature, as leading always to minus rather than plus. While in the political world he recognized the value of government as a means of maintaining liberty, he did not and does not yet always recognize industrial government as effecting the same result in another domain—his own.

The Marxian economics, it may again be pointed out, went so far astray as to identify all government with repression and to demand its complete abolition, followed in this down to our day by the advocates of communism, vainly protesting that their trend is in the direction of abolishing all political authority.

In another system of values authority may emerge with another connotation, namely, that of creator rather than of repressor; government may appear—or, authority, however called—as concerned with the release of the individual rather than with his restriction.

Authority is a collective product; yet its purposes are not solely the collectivity as such but are also the unfolding of the powers of the members of the community. It may protect privacy as well as the public. It may devote itself to setting up conditions in which personalism may expand in new forms and with richer variety than before.

Quis custodiet custodes ipsos? The answer is, in part, that

the custodians themselves will be checked by their own temperament and training.²¹ The general understandings of the community itself, rooted in the value system of the time, will operate to "guard the guardians." Deep down in the general understandings of the nature of authority, not merely the nature of its limits but the nature and kind of its possibilities—of its functions as father, as teacher, as physician, as guide, as counselor in a variety of human relations—lies the limitation of power.

If once authority is recognized to be and is an addition to, rather than a subtraction from, life, its status takes on another and quite different form in human thought and feeling. Order and justice become different shapes as their content is recognized as richer and fuller of human meaning than it has historically been. Authority may be said to acquire a moral and a scientific basis in such a setting and to attach to itself types of allegiance hitherto unrealized. Liberty, justice, and order are not economic primarily but are social in their implications.

The value systems of a region, a race, or a class; the charm of an engaging personality; the escape from insecurity in some great crisis—all these have been relied upon to support authority; but, once the creative aspects and influence of authority are recognized, the impulse to support authority is placed upon quite a different basis.

A repressive state cannot very well countenance other repressors alongside of it, for they are rivals—perhaps dangerous rivals; and the monopoly of legality is likely to be asserted. But a constructive or creative type of authority will welcome the co-operation of other joint creators engaged in the common task of construction in many different ways of life, and may join with them in tolerance and good will.

One of the oldest of human errors in the social field is the confusion of controls with punitive sanctions, of government with punishment. Indeed, this is true of theology as of politics, since the gods appear as kings; and in education the same idea is symbolized in the master's rod and the boss's whip. Governance may, however, be guidance, leadership, or direction, as well as command, obedience, or punishment.

Many groups have modern sanctions as powerful, or more so, than those of the technical governor. The doctor has his bromides and even the strait jacket; the teacher has his reprimand and exile; the industrialist has his control over employment and of the wage (in part); the church has its penances here and future penalties in the background. Doctors' orders and bosses' orders are also types of management but without the implications of political authority, yet differing little in last analysis.²⁵

To summarize this part of the discussion, the emerging type of ideal state must be able to supply a unity of purpose and program, embodying values and interests, expressed in institutions and understandings. A clearer conception of authority will not settle all the ills that flesh is heir to, but it will aid in the reconciliation of many opposing views, resting upon the fear of what hostile authority might do to their cherished interests and values.

III. ORGANIZATION

The organizational aspects of the ideal state may be sketched briefly, as follows: (1) the area of organization; (2) cosmopolitan basis of association; (3) the organization of violence; (4) the organization of consent; and (5) the organization of variation and stability.

1. The ideal area of organization supposes a jural order

of the world. Most of the classical theory upon this point is not valid now, if it ever was. There cannot be free states unless there is a free world. This does not involve necessarily a world-state, but it supposes an end of anarchy between states and the organization of a world-order. It presupposes a common understanding of "aggression" and a common method of enforcing the world's ideas of aggression,²⁶ of basic order, and of basic justice.

There may be many states in the world-order, but they will not be states from whose decisions there is no appeal in the hierarchy of justice. There may be sovereigns; but they will not be absolute, unlimited, and unreasonable. There cannot be tiny and isolated states of 5,040 persons, as Plato declared, or 10,000, as Aristotle set up, except in a world-order. There may be and will be wide areas of autonomy, political and otherwise; but they will not be areas of absolute isolation, unless quarantines are established against them. What Aristotle said of the detached hand—it could live only if it were a stone hand—will be true of the detached political association in the world-order of justice. The modern drive for world-organization is no longer merely the product of ethical hopes alone, or of generalized humanitarianism, but is the fiat of revolutionized transportation and intercommunication which has reduced the size of the world to its present shrunken dimensions, and necessitated the reorganization of a larger-scale economy. The urge comes from the burden of competitive armament; the practical realization of the unpleasant consequences of world-anarchy, in which any mad aggressor may disturb the peace of all the others in his world. It takes many to make peace, but one alone may make war; and he may be stopped only by counterwar or force in some equivalent form.

2. In the coming state the ethnic-territorial basis of association will yield to the broader cosmopolitan emphasis on the unity of mankind. The community is not a tribe, but mankind. Cultural groups of all types may freely develop in a world-order, more freely and fully than ever before in the history of mankind; but the interests of the tribal group will not be the basis of political association. Cultures may exist without crowns of sovereignty, by the tolerance and encouragement of the world in which they are set rather than by the strength of their military armaments. Transportation and communication, airplanes, radio, and television are moving inexorably forward toward a broader brotherhood of man, toward wider horizons of understanding, of appreciation, and, by the same token, of co-operation.

Upon this point the Greeks were wrong and the Romans right.

3. In the ideal state the organization of violence will be well-nigh eliminated, and what remains will be transformed in character from brute violence to higher forms of persuasion. Even in medicine, bleeding and blistering and purging are not as indispensable or as common as they were; likewise in government, there are more effective remedies than the whip or the sword.

Violence will be recognized for what it really is—a confession of unpreparedness and a counsel of impatience—a low order of energy organization. Education and medication are its antidotes and in time will work their way.

4. An organization of consent is inevitable in the ideal state. May there not come a time, it may be asked, when the conclusions of scientists regarding social behavior will be so authentic and indisputable, and so widely sought for and followed, that formalized consent will fade into the

background and eventually disappear from the scene entirely? If the wise ones know what to do, why not let them rule?

This is theoretically possible, but it is improbable. Much more will be known about social and political science in the future than now, beyond question; but—

a) There will always be a margin of alternatives—a margin where human values and choices will be important and conclusive. The broadest outlines of political policy will remain subjects for general decision. The alternatives will be more carefully considered, and the elimination of unchecked impossibilities may follow; but the final decision will be generalized rather than specialized.

b) The maintenance of community morale is facilitated by community participation in basic community affairs. Community consciousness of common interest requires common activism in community affairs from time to time. Discipline rests not upon fear but upon common consent.

c) The organization of scientific research and the organization of what is called “planning” will be better organized and articulated with the activities of the government, but they will not take the place of the organization of consent.

But the statesmen—must they survive?

There are those who regard the politicians—the politicians—as having only a nuisance value, and who hence would look forward with keen pleasure to their complete retirement from the ideal community—a world without politicians. In reality, however, the politicians serve a useful and important function in the society and, indeed, are worth more than we pay them now. They are brokers between the isolated technicians and the busy consumers who make up the community. Their weavings in and out, their conver-

sations and orations, their discussions and compromises—these are not all wasted, although some of them are. They are indispensable in the modern society in one form or another—partly as artists, partly as scientists.²⁷

Good administrative management will remove some of our troubles, and so will a higher level of intelligence regarding the role of administration on the part of the community. But there will be no organization of any supreme institute of metaphysics, of faith, or of science that will take the place of the agencies of social morale and intercommunication now labeled as “the statesmen.” To all such plans the experts should say: “Get thee behind me, Satan.”

There will, in the future, undoubtedly be even educational politicians, scientific politicians, ecclesiastical politicians. Are they unknown now? They will be interpreted in their turn by the political politicians, whose function it becomes to weave the pattern of the commonweal.²⁸

5. Stability and change. The ideal state will provide the attitudes and the mechanisms necessary for maintaining the balance between the opposite poles of stability and variation in human social and political relations.²⁹ The classical writers made the mistake of attempting to set up a type of state which would resist all the disturbing influences leading to change.

In Plato there was to be a royal lie at the beginning to insure against dissatisfaction on the part of those who might feel they were wrongly classified; and there were elaborate precautions to prevent the spirit of change from creeping in, even through new tunes, new dances, and contacts with roving sailors of uncertain social views.

For centuries the proposal of change was unwelcome to the constituted authorities. An unfortunate in France was

once put to death for dreaming that the king was dead—and not keeping his dream to himself. Some pre-psychiatrist evidently suspected that the king's subject was frustrated and might become an activist if not carefully treated in the cemetery.

As late as the first part of the nineteenth century, eminent authorities declared, with much assurance, that governments could not be changed by the conscious act of man but that they must always grow. *Laissez faire* was the idea in regard to governmental changes and interference. Even in medicine there was a hot battle between those who favored letting nature take its course and those who held to treatment by the medicos. Even now there are those who believe that any proposal of any change in the American government is treasonable—or at least subversive—even the city-manager plan or the short ballot.

On the other hand, there are those who approve all change, simply because it is change. These restless and unstable souls look eagerly in the direction of any variation in the rules of the game, whatever its type or direction—some because they are personally restless, and others because they are victims of the system, whatever it is, and believe, no doubt, that if you are sleeping on the floor you can't fall out of bed.

If there is to be important change, the traditional method is change by violent revolution. But revolutions usually change more than is necessary for their avowed purposes, as the revolutionaries get out of hand in the excitement of the struggle, and the new sense of power intoxicates the mass and the leaders alike. And, furthermore, the revolution leaves behind it a trail of bitterness and revenge that often lasts for generations, weakening the society with hates and fears that die slowly.

In the ideal state the balance would be maintained between the demands of stability and the requirements of change. I am concerned here not with the special mechanism or procedure for bringing this about but with the general principle, the general understanding, the certainty that an adequate balance is desired by the community and provided by and for them. The devices for securing this end are numerous and varied; and the details are, of course, important in any particular system. But the general understanding is still more important, for it provides the guiding-line for action by the community. This, you may say, sounds a little vague. But no. Precision in an order where precision is out of the question is not precision but pseudo-precision.

There are emergencies in the life of states when action is imminent, but the power to say whether there is or is not an emergency is difficult to vest precisely in any other final repository of power than the general understanding of the community. There would naturally be machinery for the declaration of constitutional change or inaction, but the understanding underlying this mechanism is essential to the life of the institution; it is, indeed, the institution itself essentially.

The people, said Locke, is always sovereign, although not under any form of government. The community is always master in its own house; it always retains the right to judge of the adequacy of its own institutions. Without this it may fall an easy victim to its own machinery. It is not that this residual power of judgment is to be exercised every day, but the fact of its recognized existence makes it potent in determining the course of those intrusted with a little brief authority.

CONCLUSION

All this, you may perhaps be thinking, seems very well in a fashion. Possibly, it might be a very dull, even if an ideal, state. There would be ample justice. But would there be no mercy? There would be order. But would there be no variation from the central pattern? There would be stability. But there be no adventure? There would be balance, no doubt. But would be there any room for variation?

Has the ideal state no program?

Might we not be driven, after dull days of absolute security, perhaps of a stodgy type, to rise in revolution against this orderly, just, but prosaic life? Well, you might; and I might be with you, too, if this were all the story.

It is not my purpose to, nor if I wished could I, fill in the outlines of an ideal program. I cannot tell you how, in the future in the ideal state, vegetables will be grown—in land or water; or what the radio and television may bring; or what the schools or the hospitals will be like; or what new treasures of recreation we may have found and utilized.

The flood of scientific research and invention is rushing forward in a flood with no sign of any abatement in volume or in force. New devices in transportation and communication are outdating political boundary lines; chemistry and machinery are upsetting agriculture and industry, and with them all the agencies of organized society; new sources of power are emerging and emergent; eugenics and psychology affect the whole population basis. The social implications and consequences of these discoveries and inventions will give rise—more slowly, it is true—to social discoveries, inventions, and adjustments that are certain to be fundamental and far-reaching in the range of their influence.

We look for an era of abundance; for higher standards of living than mankind has ever known. We know that this

is possible if men will adapt their social and political institutions to their technical possibilities. I have elsewhere discussed this possibility at some length. We know a fairy-land of achievement lies ahead if we will reach out and take the gifts the gods have given us abundantly.

We know that we enter an era of creative evolution, and we look forward to adventurous participation in the constructive betterment and transformation of life-conditions.

In the day when this new world to which we come is generally seen and understood—in that day, not only the concepts of power, property, and prestige but also the concept of human differences in capacity enter upon a transformation. Just as government ceases to be chiefly repression, as leadership ceases to be crass domination and exploitation, as property ceases to be largely an economic symbol of exclusive possession, and as work ceases to be chiefly long and grinding toil, the whole nature of power is being changed from the negative to the positive and is unfolding in its creative aspects. In these oncoming days we realize that not only may men achieve that personal security and community stability which might mean monotony and boredom but they may look forward to adventurous participation in the process of creative evolution—in the constructive transformation and betterment of life-conditions.

The greatest of all revolutions in the whole history of mankind is the acceptance of creative evolution as the proper role of man, for this will eventually transform the spirit and the institutions of education, of industry, and of government, opening a broad way to the realization of the highest and finest values of human life, in a form of association where leaders no longer scream and curse and threaten and where men no longer shuffle, cringe, and fear but stand erect in dignity and liberty and speak with calm voices of what clear eyes may see.

Free men—in free states—in a free world—these the ideal state may bring.

But, you ask me: "At the very end, what do you see? You are something of a seer; at least, you have seen and read and thought much of politics and states. What do you see ahead, dim as your eyes may be, and full of obsessions as your mind may be, and thick as the encircling gloom may be?"

Let me first look backward—then forward. Looking down through the long corridors of human experience—my own experience and that of others in common living in commonwealths—I see the slow emergence of human personality after many bloody and brutal checks—personality set in a framework of justice, order, liberty, reason—and see victories won by those with the courage, faith, and intelligence to struggle onward toward a distant goal. Man is a rational animal; and I observe that the animal rules from time to time, but not forever. I am no more alarmed at the outbursts of the animal than at those of the rational.

No student of government is ignorant of the long years of slavery and caste; of brutality and exploitation; of prisons, dungeons, exiles, beatings, brandings, breakings on the wheel, the screams of tortured men, the cynical gloatings and squeakings of brutal little masters and keepers dressed in a little brief authority; of the annals of weakness, wickedness, vanity, corruption, treason, folly; of incompetence, futility, cowardice, fussiness in politics; of rascality and roguery; of the long series of rows of army trenches that mark for little whiles through unending cemeteries, east and west, the flower of youth and manhood; or of the slow burning hatreds smoldering for centuries in millions of mankind.

But I see also the emergence of law; the rise of order; the organization of justice, of common counsel, of rational discussion, of management, not merely humane, but human. I see the growth of liberty. I see the gleam of the wings of

human personality emerging from its chrysalis, the wide-ranging and soaring triumph of the supremacy of the commonweal.

Looking forward, I cannot say, from the ramparts I watch, in reply to the old question you are asking, "Watchman, tell us of the night . . ."; I cannot say, "Lo, the dawn is here."

But in a moment when the world rushes forward perhaps to its most terrible, titanic, and destructive war, I see somehow an end of violence. I see an epitaph written large—an epitaph not of civilization but of war.

In a moment when exaggerated tribalism sweeps all before it, I seem to see thrusting upward from below a new world-order.

In a moment of cruel race antipathy and incredible brutality among civilized people, I seem to see the rising figure of the brotherhood of man. I seem to see that love is stronger than hate, strong as that dark passion may be, and that love will create more than hate destroys.

In a moment of widespread treason to reason, I seem to see the inexorable and inevitable triumph of intelligence over ignorance and error.

In a moment of values often measured by the standards of a pecuniary order, I seem to see a rising scale of human values richer than riches in a regime of social justice.

I see the stately structure of the new commonwealth, a temple of our common justice, a center of our common interest, a symbol of our common hope.

I do not know this. But you asked me what I saw, or seemed to see; and I am answering, through the fog and storm, as best I can.

"Brave words, professor!" you may say, if we meet in a concentration camp or an army hospital. But then my answer will be: "Patience."

IV

THE TASKS OF POLITICS

WITHIN recent weeks I reread Aristophanes' *Lysistrata* and also made a visit to Dr. Yerkes' Simian University in Florida, to which I have referred in chapter i. Both were helpful to me. You may be interested in Aristophanes' formula for the management of politics, as seen in his classic day.¹

LYSISTRATA Ah if you only could manage your politics just in the way that we deal with fleece!

MAGISTRATE Tell us the recipe

LYSISTRATA First, in the washing tub
plunge it, and scour it, and cleanse it from grease
Purging away all the filth and the nastiness
then on the table expand it and lay,
Beating out all that is worthless and mischievous,
picking the burrs and the thistles away
Next, for the clubs, the cabals, and the coteries,
banding unrighteously, office to win
Treat them as clots in the wool, and dissever them,
lopping the heads that are forming therein
Then you should card it, and comb it, and mangle it,
all in one basket of love and of unity,
Citizens, visitors, strangers, and sojourners,
all the entire, undivided community
Know you a fellow in debt to the Treasury?
Mingle him merrily in with the rest
Also remember the cities, our colonies,
outlying states in the east and the west,
Scattered about to a distance surrounding us,
these are our shreds and our fragments of wool,
These to one mighty political aggregate
tenderly, carefully gather and pull

Twining them all in one thread of good fellowship;
thence a magnificent bobbin to spin,
Weaving a garment of comfort and dignity,
worthily wrapping the People therein.

In the broadest sense, the task of politics is to deal with that part of social behavior which is concerned with the understanding of the political animal.

But it may be asked: Is this political behavior of which you speak rational behavior or nonrational behavior? This question has led to many fierce battles between those who view politics as a branch of ethics and those who consider politics as a part of natural science. The truth is that political behavior is both rational and nonrational. Governance would be simpler if men were either all one or all the other, of course. But the truth is that there are forms of rational conduct and there are forms of nonrational conduct. Most men are rational in their political behavior some of the time, but few of them all of the time. Some seem nonrational most of the time. There is a reasonable expectancy of rationality at times, and there is a reasonable expectancy of nonrationality under other conditions.

Nonrational behavior is as open to rational analysis as the rational.² For example, systems of management either in industry or in an army may be based upon the expectation of a fixed response, which is partly a rational and partly an automatic response, purely physical or becoming automatic through custom and practice. Systems of propaganda and of symbolism rest upon a blending of the rational appeal and the automatic appeal to subrational forms of motivation, through almost hypnotic forms of rhythmic action, of which the war dance was an early type.³

The significance of this automatic response was recog-

nized centuries ago by Plato when he objected to the introduction of new dances and music in the ideal state—dances and music corresponding to swing or jazz perhaps, as they tended to corrupt or disintegrate, he thought, the established pattern of the mores of the community which he had set up on an ideal basis. Much later an eminent citizen of Chicago, not a formal philosopher, said: "Politics is neither chess nor poker. It is a combination of the two in one."⁴

But it may be asked: What is the difference between political behavior and economic behavior or religious behavior, or other social behavior? This is a long and interesting story which cannot be related here and now. In general the differences are not determined by surveyor's lines indicating exclusive areas and materials but by points of view and reference, by purposes and modes of analysis, by types of proportioning and interpretation. On this occasion limits of space make it necessary for me to expound the "political" as best I can without full discussion of all its boundaries. I merely pause to say that a fixed territory and a monopoly of force, often cited as the chief characteristics of the political, are historically observable but not a necessary part of the concept of the state.⁵

Does politics, it may be asked, deal with skills, techniques, manipulations only; or does it deal also with values and ideals? What are the relative roles of values and skills in the organization of human relations—to what extent are manipulative skills tied to any particular set of values? If we examine the writings in the field, we find proponents lined up into two camps favoring one or the other.

In the tradition of Machiavelli, one point of view holds that the study of politics seeks for the techniques of manipulation without regard to the ultimate ends of that ac-

tivity; the other school claims for it the formulation of goals of effort in general or in given stages of development.⁶ Either is a partial view; politics deals with both values and skills.

The situation is only confused by the fears of the teleologists—apprehensive lest the study of manipulatory techniques will lead to the neglect of the study of political goals; or that scientific neutrality, in fact, involves the neglect of one side or the other in practical controversies and thus serves as a defense of the *status quo*. Admittedly, the state is not the chief analyst of the good or the true or the beautiful. There are competitors.

But it is one of the tasks of politics to insure the co-existence of the special values of each of them in their interrelation—the good, the true, and the beautiful—in the given society. The state is the special custodian of the political good, the politically true, the politically beautiful; but these are only elements of the larger values of which the political is only a part, however important at a special moment in a particular situation.

Unquestionably there are definite skills or techniques of politics, and of social science more broadly, which may be employed under a wide range of systems and under many different sets of ultimate values. Just as artillery may be used in a number of different kinds of causes, or an army for many different purposes, so the skills of management in an army may be used under many different circumstances—in defense of democracy, communism, naziism, or other form of association.⁷

There is a set of skills as definite as those of artillery which manipulators in government or economics may utilize without special regard to the aim of those they are serving. In this sense the “doctors” may be called in for

many different purposes and under many different flags. Sir Arthur Salter, to take a concrete example, would undoubtedly be a valuable consultant for any going concern in the political world; or Beneš of Czechoslovakia; or Brownlow of Chicago. Richelieu would have made an excellent adviser for Spain as well as for France; Grotius, the great international jurist, was indeed driven from his native land of Holland and entered the service of France and later that of Sweden. Down to relatively recent times generals and soldiers sold their services in the market where they found the most acceptable terms of employment, and it was considered dishonorable to break such an agreement even in war with one's own country.⁸

Analyzers, statisticians, interpreters, organizers, persuaders, advocates, adjudicators, administrators, propagandists, experts, and swarms of technicians possess special skills of transferable value under systems whatever their final aims may be. Local, national, and international conferences are conducted now with trains of experts and huge boxes of documents and "supporting data." Nations war with propagandists, press agents, consultants, and professionals of many types.

These skills and insights are not completely interchangeable; but many of them are almost entirely so, and others with some care in adjustment. It is easy and indeed fashionable to characterize such political behavior as Machiavellian, or Mephistophelian even, as unmoral, or even as immoral. Of course, the cynically minded might raise the question whether it is "worse" to serve a good cause badly or to serve a bad cause well.⁹

In so far as such study of the techniques of manipulation may inhibit the consideration of the ultimate values involved in human life or some phase of them, the charge

against the study of manipulation may be justified. Indeed, color is given to it at times by the indiscreet and unrestrained tendency of some manipulators to shock their hearers by unnecessary obtrusions of indifference, chiefly for the purpose of obtaining a reputation for hardness.

One of the paradoxes of politics is that there must be sovereignty, but it must also be subject to criticism and appeal intellectually and morally. It is difficult enough, one may say, to determine what the law actually is, but far more difficult to say what it might or should be technically or ideally. It is a part of the wisdom of statesmen to avoid situations emerging in which citizens must decide whether to obey God or man, or to prefer death to loss of liberty, or to turn treason into patriotic heroism, confusing the priority of their values.

The value systems of the world have a deep political meaning which cannot be ignored in any examination of the realm of the political.¹⁰ What is the nature of these values which so profoundly influence the social behavior of men and affect so deeply their political relations? The institutional patterns in which they are incorporated are easy to observe—the family, the nation, the church, the union, the club, the class, the neighborhood, the land, the folk. Around these institutions cluster symbolisms of beauty and power, summoning the individual to the heights of enthusiasm and sacrifice and giving to the sacrificial impulse or pattern a type of pleasure-pain which may transcend all others in poignancy and insistence of appeal. These values are the fiery core of patterns of cohesion, of loyalty, of allegiance; and they form a massive resistance to the wayward trends toward the satisfaction of the individual at the expense of the functioning of the group of which he is a part. Against those who flaunt them are

directed the most contemptuous epithets in the vocabulary of the time and place.

The content of these values at a given moment may seem imperishable, but their special magnetic centers change with time and with new tensions. Thus the nation may rival the feudal lord as a center of allegiance; the old flag may be superseded by another and a new design; enemies become allies; the property and the persons of the priests are taken by the hand of the law; or the king is refused obedience because of the higher law of God, and disobedience is blessed by the altar.

It is in this "fading" of the old picture into the new that some of the most serious problems of political adaptation arise. Here are problems of the adaptation of new techniques to the older value systems—or, putting it another way, the creation of new value systems to replace the old as they fade away. It is when value systems fade and fail and no others come in rapidly enough that the equilibrium of the society is shaken most.

The most tragic moments in human life are those in which the value systems are unreconciled—when one cries out against another: the family against the state, the state against the church, the neighborhood against the distant capital, life in the broader sense against nonlife or narrow life—against the end of life. Perhaps art wars against religion, or money income against shame, or justice against mercy, or law against the outlaw, or liberty with equality, or class with country. Or the ancient reluctance may be swept aside in a broad stream of new enthusiasm and new ideals and new symbols which carry the skeptics along with the enthusiasts, generating new values and new emotions as they rush forward in the wild excitement of profound social change.

It was Goethe who said: "Gray are all theories; green the shining tree of life"; and in such moments the old enthusiasms fade into drab hues as the new spring into life, color, rhythm, with the new flag, the new music, the new uniforms, the new patterns of leadership, the new symbolism concealing the steel of the new authority.

Within each of these patterns of values there are inner patterns of command and obedience—patterns of conformity and its modes and substance—varying widely to be sure, yet not without a similarity in many type forms—and always changing, but at different rates in groups and in individuals. There are limits of the field of authority quickly reached in every domain, and woe to those who are not sensitive to these restrictions or do not know how to react to their warnings when impinged upon.

The relation of the limits of conformity to one another is one of the most important of political problems, approaching the inner essence of social control; the interrelation of these patterns in a larger and more inclusive pattern—itself limited again in the same fashion as each of its constituent circles. This itself becomes a subject of technical study, and here we approach the use of skill in the manipulation of values—a profane subject to those who wish to deal with values alone—and hence think of the manipulation of values as impious—the manipulation of the sacred elements not to be touched by hands of the unbelievers.

But it is precisely with these appraisals of human values and their recombination that politics and social control must often deal—and that whether the values seem true or false. A cry of fire, false in fact, may start a panic as readily and with as fatal results as if it were true. Bismarck's forged telegram may start a war as readily as a genuine one. A demagogue, ignorant or intelligent and de-

signing, may move masses to action even as if he is neither truthful nor sincere. For purposes of political association and control, the false is true if it is accepted as true and made a basis of action.

What are the tasks of politics, first in the broader sense and second in the narrower sense? We may proceed to consider (1) in generalized form what are the common tasks of politics in the social scheme of things and then consider (2) what are the outstanding practical tasks of today.

I

In the broadest sense politics provides a framework of association in which the commonweal is the central and focal point.

"What is the commonweal?" one may inquire. Here we enter into a world of difficulties. Is the commonweal what the government or the ruling class regards as the commonweal; or is it what I think it is, at the time, in the given political society, or at some later time, viewing the situation objectively? How common must the weal be? Is the commonweal what is, or what ought to be? Obviously, there are many answers here: one drawn from an observation of what the state has typically done or what it now does; another from the point of view of what the state might have done at some time, or what the state might or ought to do now or in the future. It is the task of a rounded system of politics to neglect none of these situations in its observations, reflections, and conclusions.

But if we cannot define once and for all what is the commonweal, we may indicate how it may be defined definitively in forms of association and organization. But we may inquire: What is association and what is organiza-

tion? Association supposes a pattern of living resting upon a set of common understandings and common practices regarding various social—in this case political—situations.¹¹ Organization involves a division of labor in which special tasks devolve upon special agents whose activities are unified through a central system of clearing, co-ordination, and direction—through a form of integration, a pattern of unity.

The confusion caused by struggles over structure and function¹² has been the cause of long and learned disputations in the domain of government. In examining the works of biologists such as Herrick and Childs, I have been impressed with the fact that much the same problem arises in biology, in the study of integration of the organic system in various forms. In a sense we cannot separate structure and function wholly, since there cannot well be a structure without a function or a function without a structure. You may, of course, ask about such items as a vermiform appendix. Indeed, someone compared the New York City Council years ago to the vermiform appendix, an organ with no known use but with large possibilities of making trouble.

Through this machinery of association and organization the "commonweal" is defined authoritatively at any given time in a state. This decision may be wrong ethically, or wrong scientifically, but it is the law—the legal statement of the commonweal.¹³

If the commonweal were always perfectly evident, as it were inexorably predetermined, and if the common understandings regarding agencies and activities directed toward the realization of the commonweal were always unanimously and instantly recognized and accepted, the study of politics would be as simple as that of the government of

termites, bees, wasps, or other animal aggregations. Indeed, a defender of slavery once declared that, having read the scriptural injunction, "Go to the ant, thou sluggard," he had done so and discovered that the black ants were always overcome and became the slaves of the lighter-colored ants. Q.E.D. In our own day, as you know, there are those who find that the "collectivism" of the ants is the cause for their failure to evolve to higher types of life.¹⁴

It is generally recognized that within the framework of the commonweal there is included: defense of the given group against external attack; a system of order, through a balance of social forces; a system of justice; and a residual care for common interests, urgent but neglected by other agencies. All these are directed toward the ostensible purpose of protecting and advancing the commonweal of the political society.

In democratic societies we add the function of protecting the dignity of man, of preserving the interests of his personality, of equipping him with the status in which liberty, equality, opportunity, and fraternity may expand most readily. But we cannot say that this has been the historic program of all states.

But, it may be asked: What is this order; what is this justice; what is this protection against external attack or internal crisis; what is this balance, this equilibrium, more precisely? Confused sounds may be heard in reply: "Order is heaven's first law." "To hell with the courts. I know what justice is," said an enthusiast in Los Angeles. "*Raison d'état*," as the ax falls or the prison door clangs shut. "Oh liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name," said Mme Roland on the scaffold—not Mme Maintenon, the Pompadour, as one of my students once wrote.

Years ago, Theodore Roosevelt said to me: "Merriam, in case of a clash between order and justice, I would always be for order first, wouldn't you?" I replied: "I belong to the Sons of the American Revolution."

But still the Grand commander of the S.A.R. once criticized a talk of mine in which I had frequently used the word "revolution" in relation to technological trends. He said: "I should prefer in these cases the use of the word 'development.'" He did not smile when I later suggested that perhaps he believed the name of our worthy order should be changed to "Sons of the American Development."

I might define all these words for you. In 1832 a talented man named Lewis wrote a volume on the use and abuse of political terms. He undertook to settle, once and for all, the political troubles of mankind by fixing definitely the meaning of political terms. Lewis fixed them, but—the words go merrily on 117 years later without the special meanings Lewis attached to them.¹⁵ Of course, we now have institutes of semantics.

But politics does provide a framework within which the meaning of these terms may be discovered in special instances through regular and recognized channels: through declaration, interpretation, administration, and adjudication. In the narrower sense, law and politics put a point to controversy through their agencies—on the theory that some decision is better than unending uncertainty.

But may not justice be substantially unjust and order be a cloak for greed or conquest? Yes, or liberty a mask for slavery? At this very moment thousands of bruised bodies, broken hearts, and crushed souls are groaning against what they declare is injustice. And so do I. But this only means that one of the tasks of politics has been

historically and now is to provide a rational framework within which appeal may be made from the errors of the nominal ruler to the judgment of the community.

From the point of view of a personality the appeal may be made to norms of conduct, discovered by the way of rational analysis or by social experience and experiment. From the point of view of the special responsibility of the political, judgment may be rendered in terms of the relation between a special act, such as the persecution of the Jews, and the ends of the special state, as Germany, or in relation to the generalized purposes of states as such. Was the act of the government in line with the function of the state? Obviously, the state has many forms of balance to consider and to adjust in the larger frame.

It is consequently the task of politics to be prepared to deal with all comers and all elements of the social life of the situation. The reconciliation of these factors, even in the narrower field of politics, is no easy enterprise. The state must deal with the army rulers, with the theocrats, with the plutocrats, with the politicians, with the bureaucrats. The state develops its own parasitic growths, its own camp followers, its own inner decay arising from its own inner problems. States must set up and maintain a working balance between personalities, interests, and ideologies, in calm and in storm.

They must provide for a balance between order and justice, a balance between stability and change, a balance between equality and inequality, a balance between liberty and authority, and must minimize the maladjustment between the political values and needs of men and other values and needs of mankind, at particular times—a balance between competing and conflicting social interests. The maintenance of what I have called a “moving equilib-

rium" of complex social forces at all times challenges the capacity of states for adjustment, for statics and dynamics as well.

The politicians are not embarrassed by common humanity. We have always welcomed all sorts of friends and acquaintances and have kept open house in politics. We have never been ashamed to sit with the Scribes and Pharisees or with the publicans and the sinners.

We look with complacency upon new and sometimes just a trifle alarming developments, and we shall be quite ready to welcome to our hospitable bosom all the younger recruits of science. We shall be very happy if the doctors are able to show us that by controlling the spasticity of colons we can carry the precinct a little more strongly, or that delicate studies of the sympathetic or parasympathetic nature of the obsessionate or hysterical will reduce the number of Democratic votes, or Republican, as the case may be.

We welcome the biochemists. I do not wish to omit them, because as a legal principle in a series of enumerations the unenumerated is excluded. If they can develop methods by which we can modify and control the human organism and affect its behavior, well and good. We have no prejudice against treatments of thyroid or pituitary or endocrine or any other kind of glands. When they are all discovered, then we shall be able to reorganize them in a new synthesis.

Or if our friends the anthropologists can throw any light upon a national convention by discussing an Indian war dance, why shouldn't we learn that? Why shouldn't we incorporate that in our files and make use of it also, along with all the relevant material from the ways of "folk society"?

If any of our psychological friends can discover all the differentials in the human faculties, they will be very helpful to us. We will guarantee to make a more practical use of them than do some psychologists.

We have been struggling to ascertain these things ourselves by the rule-of-thumb method. If, then, we get all the differentials in abstract intelligence or concrete intelligence (if there is such a thing), we shall be very happy and particularly happy, of course, to have the differentials in political intelligence. If we find the differentials in the emotions and temperaments (I am not sure whether these things still exist in the rapid flux of terms), or whatever else may be developed that will give us a more minute knowledge of human nature and make more effective our present admittedly imperfect systems of political management, we always say: "God bless those who bring us these gifts."

But we wonder what is going to happen when all the data are collected, when the last document is filed showing the complete record of the last human being down to the last element in psychological composition, and when the psychopathologists have analyzed the last dream of the last type and understand all about the dominant reveries of every human being (not "dominant revels," as one of my students called it). The answer is that when all these documents are filed, we shall then move ahead to a new system of indexing, interpretation, and integration, to a new system of adjustment, the organization of new types of mechanisms.

It is one of the great tasks of politics—"task No. 1," we say in these times—to develop superior ways of approach to the problem of arriving at political truth, political reality, and political knowledge and understanding. The po-

litical maxims of the Chinese and the Hindus astonish us even today with their pungent wisdom, but they are not enough. The philosophical heights reached by the classical scholars arouse our admiration after many centuries, but they are not enough for our day. The subtleties of the formal logicians in the great medieval period arouse our interest and attention, but they are not enough. Nor are the later craftsmen who wove the fabric of *naturrecht* and revolutionary philosophy. They still leave much to be desired. The immense and staggering proliferation of modern empirical and experimental science has revealed untold wealth of data and laws; but the very richness of the new material has left us somewhat bewildered.

There lies before us the titanic task of distilling these various systems—of providing new types of political understanding as an aid to the social and political reorientation of the coming generation.¹⁶ Who will gather together Aristotle, Aquinas, Locke, Rousseau, Marx, Mill, Freud, Darwin, Dewey; philosophy, religion, science, humanism, in an architectonic scheme of politics utilizing the divergent elements for a new structure? The conflicting points of view announced in the Kremlin, the Vatican, Unter den Linden, the White House, or somewhere in China threaten the peace and happiness of mankind, in a conflict which may thrust us back a thousand years, back and down the steep way we have climbed to modern civilization.

And this search for guiding considerations is the supreme quest of our day, for it conditions the pursuit of all other occupations, activities, and ways of life. The poisoned world calls for politicists in the true sense of the term—political philosophers, political scientists, political technologists, and politically sophisticated peoples. Reason,

science, faith, techniques, and values may find points of union, in which politics may frame a way of life appealing to reasonable men everywhere. In scriptural terms, we count not ourselves to have attained, but we strive to follow after.

II

OUTSTANDING TASKS OF TODAY

The task of politics in our day, aside from the reformulation of the science of politics in a new synthesis including the new elements in the domain of human knowledge, may be stated as "the translation of scientific gains into social gains under the direction of human intelligence." Under this there may be included: (1) adjustment of politics to new means of intercommunication and transportation; (2) adjustment of politics to new technological systems of production of goods and services; (3) adjustment of politics to new methods of management and administration; (4) adjustment of politics to a new tempo of change and to a world of creative evolution; (5) adjustment of politics to a new intellectual climate of tolerant discussion.

1. The units of political organization have been put out of joint by modern methods of communication and transportation. Local areas of historic fame, such as communes, townships, counties, and satellite cities, have been outmoded by the radio and the telephone, by good roads, and by airplanes. On the larger scale the older functions of states and provinces are likewise out of date in many instances. On the still larger scale the boundaries of many nations have been wiped out by modern air transportation. The old system of metes and bounds is out of date, and the world must be resurveyed.

How to adjust the old traditional forms to the realities

of the new day is everywhere a basic task of the inventive political scientist. War is, of course, a means of bringing about some types to solutions. But the task of politics is to keep ahead of war, if possible, and to anticipate situations which explode in clashes of force. War breaks the shackles of old traditions; but it brings new traditions of its own, new hates, and feuds and memories of victory and defeat, which linger on for long periods of time.

On every level of government there is need for inquiring and inventive minds to aid in the gigantic task of readjusting the units and functions of government to modern times. Plato with his ideal state of 5,040 persons and Aristotle with his city of 10,000 will not help much at this point, however useful at others.

Specifically, it is one of the tasks of politics to reconsider the position of the urban community in the larger state of which it is a part. Not to go farther from home for an illustration, the representation of Chicago in our Illinois legislature is just what it was in 1900, in spite of the great growth in numbers and wealth. The role of the urban community in the nation has recently been developed by the National Resources Committee and in brilliant discussions by the challenging, if somewhat eccentric, Mumford.¹⁷

It is one of the tasks of politics to reconsider the integration of national states—to see whether national governments have powers commensurate with their national responsibilities. France and England solved this problem a long time ago, but in other countries the problem is still an acute one, as in the United States.¹⁸ The distribution of powers and functions appropriate to the new world of transportation and communication is one of the outstanding questions challenging the inventive ability of students of government the world over.

It is one of the tasks of politics to consider and contrive measures designed to bring about the establishment of a jural order of the world. The radio, the airplane, and the fast ship have made the earlier national securities insecure and challenge the inventiveness of builders of new forms of international relationships. This is not the occasion to discuss the detail of particular measures, but the general principle of world-wide jural organization is sound.¹⁹ Without such an order, there is no security anywhere in the wide world—only anarchy. The state of nature is a potential state of war.

Devices of intercommunication have upset the ways of government in another field. The new despotism and despotic leadership is due in no small part to the rise of means of communication which enables ambitious aspirants to organize caricatures of fact called "propaganda" and to shout them directly and instantly to great masses of citizens hitherto not to be reached without great delay. This has exercised a profound influence upon the representative forms of government. Over the head of parliaments and legislatures the power-hungry may appeal directly to masses of men, hoping to obtain a mandate for action without discussion, deliberation, or delay in any parliamentary institution. This is not the organization of social conflict in orderly form but is the substitution of "unilateral discussion," if we may use such a term, for rational discussion. There is assertion ranging through the entire community, but no answer in the whole mass of the state.

2. It is one of the tasks of politics to adjust the understandings and institutions of our day to the new era of abundance to which we have come through the extraordinary development of modern science in first instance and through the technological applications of science in final

result. Both industrial production and agricultural production have so enlarged the effectiveness of human effort that the age of want is at an end, if the devices of political and social and economic organization are equal to the situation. Famine, pestilence, flood, and fire have, in large measure, been brought under control; but the business cycle has not yielded so readily to management. In consequence, poverty often stalks about in an age of plenty, and war is not yet outlawed.

Unemployment and insecurity have undermined the morale of men and have weakened the foundations of modern government at many points.²⁰ The restless shuffling of many millions of feet heard around the world are the sign of a discontent that blazes forth from time to time in revolutionary fury. Great sections of mankind are now in revolt against outmoded parts of nineteenth-century political and economic institutions. They feel that they bear unequally the losses of depression but do not share the gains of gainful periods. They will not be denied in their struggle for recognition on a higher level of life. To put the idle in the army is not a permanent solution.

But is this the task of politics, or is the responsibility that of economics? This is, indeed, their joint responsibility—reluctant, as they may sometimes seem, to associate with each other. At one time there was political economy, and there may be again.²¹ Their union is indeed the price of life, for a ruthless world will not long be interested in an isolation of disciplines that provides no formula for peace and prosperity. If reason cannot find the way, then unreason and force are ready with fire and sword. All this will compel the reconsideration of many practices and devices on the border line between industry and government.

The institution through which the advance is made may well be that of resources planning in one form or another. The spirit may be that of determination to increase national income and to provide for guaranties that the gains of civilization are equitably distributed throughout the community that produces them.

The national budgets of many lands are unbalanced not only in the narrower and technical fiscal sense but in the larger social meaning of national productivity. National resources are wasted on a gigantic scale through failure to insist upon the highest and best uses of oil, of soil, of coal, of timber, of energy resources, while the labor of the unemployed is a wasted resource. Folded hands cost civilization a great deal. National capital is wasted away absolutely and also relatively by failure to produce what might be produced with modern technology.

Sound planning is based upon technical knowledge of the underlying data, upon intelligent and forward-looking analysis of policies, upon close interrelation of national and local, public, and private policies one with another, and upon the intelligent, considered selection of alternative courses. Governments which cannot or will not plan to meet the problem of insecurity, of fair distribution of national losses when we are losing, and of fair distribution of civilization's gains when we are gaining are likely to go down in wild confusion.²² Planning is not intervention as much as it is prevention—the prevision that prevents fire by wise precautions rather than the extinction of fires after they have begun their deadly work.

3. One of the tasks of politics is the adjustment to new modes of management and administration.²³ Far-reaching progress has been made in the management of men in the past generation. This ranges from what is technically

termed "scientific management" to the development of new forms of modern governmental and industrial administration. Administration advances from an art toward a science; from a body of practices to a body of principles; from a personal knack to a transferable technique; from rule-of-thumb to controlled results. Administrative management is a characteristic development of our time.

Much of the work of government is administration. Legislators determine general policies, and courts construe them; but the administrators apply policies to daily realities, and the application is often the life or death of the policy.

It is one of the prime tasks of politics to make sure that the administrative tools of policy are of the best type and that they are steadily improved with the advance of administration generally. The day of the spoilsmen, incredible as this may seem to some, is over; they may linger here and there, but they are on the way out of modern political life. This is due not wholly to civil-service reform leagues, useful as they may be, but to the fact that the affairs of government are too technical and difficult to be managed by those without the training and competence necessary for the job.

Yet in the United States, especially, despite many notable examples of high-level efficiency, this is still a major task of politics. There are those who still cling to the belief that in order to be democratic we must be inefficient; that a weak government will keep us strong; that incapacity is liberty. These are the slogans that lead to national impotence, to humiliation, and even to annihilation.

4. A major task of politics is that of adjustment to the new tempo of change and to the realization that we live

in a world of creative evolution in which science and intelligence play their greatest role in history.²⁴

Tradition is a good servant but a hard master. And modern politics in many places is still the slave of the day gone by. There is much in the old saying that the sons of revolutionists are seldom revolutionists. The past teaches great lessons and should be carefully studied. But one of its greatest lessons is: not to worship the past as a god; not to hoard our heritage, but to develop it.

The greatest of all revolutions in the history of mankind is the revolution wrought in the modern world by the discoveries of reason and science, with the vast increase brought to the wealth and possibilities of mankind. It is in this spirit that the future of politics must also be wrought out. Yet for this we are in many ways unprepared in habits of political thought, professionally and popularly.

Politics calls for imagination, for invention, for courage to try, if not to achieve. If scientists will not try, then what Huxley calls the "madmen" will. The future of justice and its forms, the future of liberty and its forms, the future of order and its forms, the future of equality and inequality and their forms, the future of the balance of the state and its forms, the future meaning of the commonweal and its forms in the light of modern science—these are all as legitimate and necessary subjects of political speculation as the past of any of them. Only too often they are neglected—the prophetics—in the quest for accurate description and for political genetics—important as these are in the science of politics.

5. Finally, a task of practical, as well as of theoretical, politics is that of creating an intellectual climate in which rational discussion of the assumptions and implications of politics is possible. Without this, decisions must be reached

by force, with reason cowering in the rear. But the clouds are gathering over free discussion of courses of political behavior. The oncoming generation, if the shadows continue to fall, might accept the conclusions reached by brute force as your political creed and your political science.

The gates of many great universities have been closed. Berlin, my old Alma Mater, screams like a witch-hunter, forgetting *Lernfreiheit* and *Lehrfreiheit*. The University of Vienna, once the proud home of winged speculation, flutters wounded. The University of Bologna is a museum of taxonomy of credenda: "Believe. Obey. Fight." The University of Prague has abandoned the traditions of Comenius and Huss, of Masaryk and Beneš.

American universities are riding the storm, but the clouds are gathering around free thought in America. Do not be mistaken upon that. It will require all the effort of the stoutest and bravest souls to carry on. I do not doubt the outcome; but I am warning of the storm and of the world-wide pressure to suppress free discussion of the basic principles of politics, economics, and social science.

It is one of the prime tasks of politics and politicians, then, to keep clear the lines of free communication, free discussion, and free construction; to organize and effect rational consideration of controverted subjects. Without imagination and invention, without courage and idealism, politics is a form of paleontology—without the objective and scientific attitude of paleontologists, I hasten to add, remembering that my brother is one of them.

Reason must yield to force, some say, in this era of open assertion that might makes right, within the state and without. No, the answer is that reason itself is the greatest force, and in the end it will prevail. The great work of politics is to promote the commonweal as seen by reason

and applied by reasonable measures through reasonable men. But reason must be allied with will, with faith, with hope, with practical judgment, and must be set as the jewel in organization and management. It is one of the very greatest tasks of politics, now and always, to bring about the fusion of these factors—their union and their expression—in the richest forms of social and political life.

Men of reason and good will need not fear any final triumph of gangsters at home or abroad. The G-men conducted the king of Chicago gangsters to a place called Alcatraz; in earlier times Napoleon landed on St. Helena. Those who spit in reason's face must reach for the guns and explosives that reason made, hoping that the irrational use of reason will waft them to the skies. Well, we, too, can will; we, too, can act; we, too, can endure; we, too, can trust, obey, and fight, but in the light of reason and in the spirit of good will.

Well roars the storm to him who hears above the waves
Its deeper voice proclaiming truth and social justice.

APPENDIX

NOTES

In the following pages are assembled the notes to which reference is made throughout the text. No attempt is made to present exhaustive bibliographies of works, but rather to indicate suggestive lines of research and exposition.

In the preparation of this material I am greatly indebted to my research assistant, Harold Elstien, who has labored diligently on this task.

I

THE ORGANIZATION OF VIOLENCE

The development of a rigorous conceptual framework sharply delimiting violence from nonviolence as aspects of human relationships remains to be done. Current and past treatments have been content to make only the rough common-understanding approach, as in the popular presentation here. But see "Force and Coercion," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVI, 364 *et passim*. See also W. W. Willoughby, *The Ethical Basis of Political Authority* (1930). In a similar vein is Catlin's *Principles of Politics* (1930), chap. v, and C. J. Friedrich's *Constitutional Government and Politics* (1937), chap. i. See also W. Y. Elliott, "Force, Political," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, VI, 338-41; L. K. Frank, "Cultural Coercion and Individual Distortion," *Psychiatry*, Vol. II, No. 11 (February, 1939).

The work of the experimental biologists and the physiological psychologists, such as Pavlov, Cannon, Dunbar, and Lashley, is of great significance here. Satisfactory analysis, however, awaits the solution of basic problems.

1. R. M. Yerkes, *The Great Apes* (1929).

2. Surprising parallels and suggestive approaches to the problems at the human level are to be found in the studies of R. M. Yerkes, *op. cit.* (n. 1); S. Zuckerman, *Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* (1932); W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes* (1925); C. J. Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Animal Behavior* (1924); F. Alverdes, *Social Life in the Animal World* (1927) and *Psychology of Animals in Relation to Human Psychology* (1932); W. C. Allee, *Animal Aggrega-*

tions (1931), *Social Life of Animals* (1938), and *Animal Life and Social Growth* (1939), and H Klüver, *Behavior Mechanisms in Monkeys* (1939) Of peculiar interest is W N and L K Kellogg, *The Apes and the Child* (1939)

Studies of the insect kingdom are equally stimulating Among these, the following are especially pertinent J H Fabre, *The Hunting Wasps* (1915), W. Wheeler, *Social Life among the Insects* (1923) and, especially, *Forbes of Insects and Men* (1928) On the excellent organization of the termites see A E Emerson and E Fish, *Termite City* (1937), and A D Ims, *Social Behavior in Insects* (1931) Among the most relevant articles in the growing periodical literature on the subject are A H Maslow, "The Role of Dominance in Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra Human Primates," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XLIX (1936), 261-77, (with S Flanzbaum), XLIX, 161-98 See also the important articles of Maslow, "Dominance Feeling, Behavior, and Status," *Psychological Review*, Vol XLIV, and of C Murchison, "The Experimental Measurement of a Social Hierarchy in *gallus domesticus*," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, XII (1935), 3-99 See on the whole problem in this sphere Theodore Just (ed), *Plant and Animal Communities* (1939)

3 On the primitives there is a great wealth of anthropological literature not yet thoroughly digested for the purposes of politics, as in Levy-Bruhl, Boas, Malinowski, Rivers, Kroeber, Mead, Benedict, and others See especially Mead (ed), *Competition and Co-operation among Primitive Peoples* (1937) See also M A May and L Doob, *Competition and Co-operation* (1937)

4 The growing literature on child psychology contains glimpses of the answers to many of the problems of politics Consult A Gesell, "Child Psychology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, III, 391-92, and the excellent select bibliography on p 428 of that volume See also W I and D S Thomas, *The Child in America* (1928), Charlotte Buhler, *The Mental Development of the Child* (1930), and "Social Behavior of the Child" in C Murchison's *Handbook of Child Psychology* (1931), chap vii, M B Parten, "Leadership among Pre-school Children," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol XXVII (1932-33), Susan Isaacs, *Social Development in Young Children* (1933), Lois M Jack, "An Experimental Study of Ascendant Behavior in Pre-school Children," *University of Iowa Studies*, Vol IX (1934), E D Partridge, *Leadership among Adolescent Boys* (1934), D T Paige, "The Measurement and Prediction of Leadership," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol XLI (1935), M L Page, "The Modification of Ascendant Behavior in Pre-school Children," *University of Iowa Studies*, Vol XII (1936) One of the most significant and objective of recent psychoanalytic studies is the work reported by David M Levy, "Maternal Overprotection A Human Relationship Study," *Psychiatry*, Vol II (February, 1939) Some attention to the foregoing approaches is discernible in D A Prescott's *Emotion in Education* (1938) but is conspicuously absent in A J Jones's *The Education of Youth for Leadership* (1939)

5 The leadership or dominance problem is a phase of both social and indi-

vidual psychology (if there is any fundamental difference between these disciplines) appearing in studies dealing generally with the personality from varying standpoints. Among recent works valuable both as a compendium and as an exposition of the author's "personalist psychology," is G. W. Allport's *Personality* (1937). See also E. Sapir's "Personality," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, and E. Schneider, *Les Types humains* (3 vols., 1937). The cultural approach is well developed in J. S. Plant, *Personality and the Culture Pattern* (1937). Recently a collection of eclectically oriented experimental studies is described in H. Murray, *Explorations in Personality* (1939). For the relations of various facets of psychoanalytical theory a good summary is contained in I. Henricks, *Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis* (1934). For an important critical analysis by a noted practitioner see Karen Horney, *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (1939). A somewhat novel critique appears in J. F. Brown, "Freud and the Scientific Method," *Philosophy of Science*, I (1934), 323-38. The use of the psychoanalytic-psychiatric orientation has spread through the works of many social scientists in different fields of specialization. E. Sapir, Mead, and Warner, among the anthropologists, H. D. Lasswell and G. E. G. Contlin, among the political scientists, and John Dollard, among the sociologists, are instances of the diffusion of techniques in our intellectual community. On dominance see L. Moreno, *Who Shall Survive?* (1934). H. D. Lasswell, *Politics, Who Gets What, When, How* (1936), also John Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* (1937), M. Horkheimer (ed.), *Studien über Autorität und Familie* (1936), and E. Stansky, *Subordination, Authority, Psychotherapy* (1928). On aggression see J. Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression* (1939), Merriam, *Political Power* (1934), chap. 1, "The Birth of Power." For experimental findings on dominance-aggression-submission-deference see D. Levy, "Aggressive-Submissive Behavior and the Frohlich Syndrome," *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, XXXVI (1936), 991-1020, and P. Eisenberg, "Expressive Movements Related to the Feeling of Dominance," *Archives of Psychology* (1937), pp. 73 ff. See also the studies of Maslow (n. 2, above).

6 On competition and co-operation see Mead (ed.), *op cit* (n. 3), and see the thorough canvass by May and Doob, *op cit* (n. 3). See also, from the technological laboratories, the most recent work of T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (1938).

7 I have in preparation a memorandum on the general subject of leadership, to be completed in the near future, which will contain a more ample consideration of the competing approaches.

8 James Bryce, "Obedience," in *Essays on History and Jurisprudence*.

9 The works of sociologists and anthropologists dealing with the phenomena of custom and tradition are vast in number—equalled only, perhaps, by those of the historical jurists. See Sapir's representative bibliography in *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, III, 602, also M. Ginsberg, "Conventions," *ibid.*, pp. 351-58. On ceremonies, see Lowie's and Delisle Burns's summary and

bibliography in *ibid.*, II, 313-16. See also in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*: Benedict, "Ritual," II, 398-98, "Magic," X, 44, and "Myth," XI, 173-81; Mead, "Tabu," XIV, 502-5; and Goldenweiser's "Totemism," XIV, 657-60. On the whole problem see Merriam, *The Making of Citizens* (1931).

10. See Merriam, *Political Power* (1934), chap. iv, "The Credenda and Miranda of Power."

11. See Max Nomad, *Rebels and Renegades* (1932), and Angelica Balabanoff, *My Life as a Rebel* (1938).

12. See Merriam, *The Role of Politics in Social Change* (1937), chap. iii, "The Philosophy of Pessimism and the Practice of Violence." A more systematic discussion of the recent theories glorifying violence appears in Merriam, *The New Democracy and the New Despotism* (1939), Part II, pp. 191-243. On the general aspects see Lasswell, "Conflict, Social," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, IV, 194-96; H. M. Kallen, "Coercion," *ibid.*, pp. 617-19. See also the notes on "Political Force," "Sanction," "Conquest," and "Violence" by W. Y. Elliott and others in *ibid.*

13. In the *Anthology of Revolutionary Poetry* are collected some of the more recent flaming declarations against organized violence.

14. C. M. Case, *Non-violent Coercion* (1923), remains the leading treatment of the subject. R. B. Gregg's *The Power of Non-violence* (1939) is a good review of both doctrine and practice. See also H. N. Brailsford, "Passive Resistance and Non-co-operation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 9-13, and *Political Power*, chap. vi, "The Poverty of Power."

15. *Der Begriff des Politischen* (1933).

16. *Political Power*, pp. 137-39; see also F. L. Schuman, *International Politics* (1st ed.), chaps. xiii and xvi.

17. See "Force and Coercion," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVI, 364 ff.; also W. W. Willoughby, *The Ethical Basis of Political Authority* (1930).

18. George M. Stratton, "The Docility of the Fighter," *International Journal of Ethics*, XXVI, 308. A mine of information is condensed in A. Vagts, *A History of Militarism* (1937). See also my *The New Democracy and the New Despotism*, pp. 132-45, "Democracy and Decisionism."

19. Recently Charles Mauras, who refused to accept a challenge to a duel because "it is out of date," was cheered next day when initiated into the French Academy. See W. D. Wallis, "Dueling," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, V, 268-70.

20. *Political Power*, pp. 135-37; von Hentig, "Punishment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XII, 712-16; and Sellin, "Penal Institutions," *ibid.* H. E. Barnes has produced the most comprehensive historical studies on this subject, amply summarized in "Criminology," *ibid.*, IV, 584-92. See also G. H. Dession, "Psychiatry and the Conditioning of Criminal Justice," *Yale Law Journal*, XLVII (January, 1938), 319-41. Less optimistic on the probabilities are E. Sutherland and C. E. Gehlke, in *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Vol. II,

especially pp. 1166-67. Novel procedures utilized by the Russians are described by M. Callcott, *Russian Justice* (1935), and L. von Koerber, *Soviet Russia Fights Crime* (1935). See also J. N. Hazard, "Reforming Soviet Criminal Law," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, XXIX, 157-69.

21. Trends are not, of course, irreversible; and the present state of affairs has led more than one commentator to envisage a return to barbarism and to succumb to a general attitude of Spenglerian gloom. Anticipation is obviously risky; nonetheless, a prudent appraisal of the trends of forces bears out optimism.

22. See *Political Power*, chaps. ii, vi, ix, "The Survival of the Fittest"; *Role of Politics*, chap. v, "Strategic Controls." The problem here is, of course, only the obverse of the problem of the "Organization of Consent" and is more fully documented in the notes to chap. ii. The literature on civil liberties, censorship, and repression is vast, yet not systematic in orientation. See Lasswell, Casey, and Smith, *Propaganda and Pramtional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*, and W. Albig, *Public Opinion* (1939).

23. On *raison d'état*, see Coker's comprehensive chapter in *Recent Political Thought* (1934), and F. Meinecke, *Die Idee der Staatsrason in der neueren Geschichte* (3d ed., 1929). There is room for studies of the rationalizations used by the Germans and Russians in the "purges" which have sensationalized their recent history. See also E. Flammarion, *L'Intolérance religieuse et la politique* (1911), and W. E. Garrison, *Intolérance* (1934).

24. S. W. Halperin, *Italy and the Vatican at War* (1939). See also chap. iii, n. 6.

25. The general problem is treated in C. J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics* (1937), especially chap. ix and Bibliography. To what extent, it may be asked, do T. Abel's thesis and methods in *Why Hitler Came to Power* (1938) coincide with those of Schuman in *The Nazi Dictatorship* (1935). More recently Karl Loewenstein has thoroughly surveyed the field in a series of challenging articles, which, however, tend to overemphasize the juristic at the expense of the political-psychological. See "Legislative Control of Political Extremism in European Democracies," Parts I and II, *Columbia Law Review*, XXXVIII (April and May, 1938), 591-622, 725-75. See also Robert S. Rankin, *When Civil Law Fails* (1939), and H. Elstien, "Democratic Tolerance of Anti-democratic Organization" (doctoral thesis in preparation at the University of Chicago). Also, D. Strong, "Anti-revolutionary, Anti-Semitic Organizations in the United States, 1933-38" (unpublished doctoral thesis of the University of Chicago, 1939). The administrative aspects of this problem have been neglected in most of the works on the phase. Crane Brinton skirts the fringes in his recent *Anatomy of Revolution* (1939). Whether the form of organization or technical skills, or personnel, or the morale of overturned systems is chiefly involved is not yet shown. See below, chap. ii, nn. 16 and 21, for references to the management of management.

26. See H. A. Murray, "Effect of Fear upon Estimates of the Maliciousness of

Other Personalities. *Journal of Social Psychology*, IV, 310-29 The psycho-analytic-psychiatric approach to the problem of the effects of personal insecurity is suggestive. See e.g., K. Horne, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (1937). Various authors have combined the Freudian hypotheses with the Marxian to explain the overturns on the Continent as the result of the neuroses of the middle classes. See the works of Lasswell and Schuman, *op cit*, and more recently the article by L. K. Frank, "Cultural Coercion and Individual Distortion," *op cit*, p. 120. One cannot yet say that these formulations have reached the refinement of rigorous demonstration.

27 Josephine H. MacLachy (ed.), *Education on the Air*, 1939. Institutions such as the Institute of Propaganda Analysis have possibilities for just so long as they retain their objectivity.

28 See Merriam, *New Democracy*, pp. 132 ff., and citations there.

29 J. S. Omond, *Parliament and the Army* (1933).

30 Ernst R. Huber, *Heer und Staat in der deutsche Geschichte* (1938), and Reinhard Hohn, *Verfassungskampf und Heersud* (1938).

31 Consult N. Angell, "Pacifism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, XI, 527-28.

32 The recent growth of self-consciousness on the part of scientists leading to associations pledged to withhold their skills and discoveries from antisocial uses is an encouraging note.

33 The journal *Psychiatry* contains trail-breaking material in this connection in Dallas G. Sutton's (assistant surgeon-general, United States Navy) "The Utilization of Psychiatry in the Armed Forces," Vol. II, No. 11 (February, 1939), and see the editorial "Psychiatry and the National Defense," *ibid*. On the seamy side, in sources which must be used with caution, are phenomena such as reported by G. Seldes, *You Can't Do That* (1938), chap. xvii. See also the works of Loewenstein and Rankin, *op cit* (n. 25, above), and Z. Chaffee, *State House vs. Pent House* (1937).

34 See my *The New Democracy and the New Despotism*.

II

THE ORGANIZATION OF CONSENT

1 On the general subject of obedience it is well to maintain the distinction between the two phases of the problem, namely, the techniques of securing it and the justification or moralization of any such pattern.

2 On the growth and development of "the" common law see Sir Frederick Pollock's *The Genius of the Common Law* (1912) (still very suggestive), see also Roscoe Pound, *The Spirit of the Common Law* (1921).

3 On the *naturrecht* theories see W. A. Dunning, *History of Political Theories*, Vol. II, and standard writers in this field. Recent developments are ably dissected in Catlin, *Principles of Politics* (1930), chaps. 1-41. See also C. G. Haines,

The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (1930) A careful, rigorous body of normative theory of law has stemmed from the school of which Kelsen is perhaps the ablest representative See Kelsen, "The Pure Theory of Law," *Law Quarterly Review*, L (1934), 474 ff., and LI (1935), 517 See also William Ebenstein, *Die Rechtsphilosophische Schule der reinen Rechtslehre* (1938) Cf K Olivecrona, *Law as Fact* (1939), John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (1939)

4 Merriam, *History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau* (1900) A broad canvass is touched on in H E Cohen's *Recent Theories of Sovereignty* (1937)

5 Leslie Stephen, *The English Utilitarians* (1900), and E Halevie's magisterial work, *La Formation du radicalisme philosophique* (1901-4, trans Morris, 1928)

6 The degrees along the continuum between the poles of coercion and consent and the mechanisms involved have not as yet been explicitly demarcated and rigorously differentiated by philosophers, ethicists, politicians, sociologists, or by social and individual psychologists What types of stimuli—"external" and "internal"—may we identify as instinct, imitation, suggestion, persuasion, and especially "rational" persuasion? No clear-cut answer as yet appears in the clashing views of the numerous schools The limits of the intervals and the transition points will necessarily be arbitrarily defined, but the operations for identifying and understanding them will have to be much refined before we can make comparisons with anything more than the roughest sort of accuracy

One test of psychological voluntarism, in the last analysis, is the expressed attitude of the person interviewed It is apparent, however, that the individual may feel himself free or persuaded by rational argument by virtue chiefly of the fact that he is unaware of how he is "determined," unaware of the operation of his nonrational emotive structure (see for further comment, chap iv, nn 2-4) We need not be committed in advance to either the mechanistic or the electrodynamic orientations See Sylvia H MacColl, *A Comparative Study of the Systems of Lewin and Koffka with Special Reference to Memory Phenomena* (1939), for a discussion of the assumptions underlying the application of these two conceptual approaches See, also, for a very lucid discussion of the logical problems involved, Susan Stebbing, *Philosophy and the Physicists* (1937)

On the rational-irrational-nonrational problem in general see chap iv and references cited

The problem of individual and group freedom has been discussed without end, with no agreement in sight This is the old problem of the freedom of the will of the individual and of the role of voluntarism in shaping the pattern of institutional change and development Talcott Parsons' recent critical treatment of Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber is unusually clear in stating the problems involved, albeit not conclusive in the proposals made The recent digressions of the mathematical physicists into the field of theology and psychology are treated to a penetrating analysis and a good-natured spoofing at an advanced level by logician Stebbing, *op cit* A more difficult but important discussion is

that of Henry Margenau, "The Meaning and Scientific Status of Causality," *Philosophy of Science*, VI (April, 1934), 133-49

7 For a recent discussion of the problem from the standpoint of the making of constitutional consensus see Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Politics* (1937), chaps viii-v

8 See Dunbar, *Motions and Bodily Changes* (1934), but see also K S Lashley, *Studies in the Dynamics of Behavior* (1932), *passim*, and "Conclusions" at pp 240-43

9 E M Sait has recently revived the charges of many antidemocrats relying on very dubious reasoning. Thus, inequality in business or economic (bargaining) ability is alleged, first, to be biological, or hereditary, in base. It is then inferred that, if some are superior in acquisitive skill, these ought to rule. Query: Is profit-taking skill hereditary? By what logic may we reason from *is* to *ought*? (See Sait's *Political Institutions* [1938], pp 411 ff., 445, 464-65.) Cf his own admission, p 46 (cf Aristotle: "those who are unequal in one respect, for example, wealth, consider themselves to be unequal in all"), and see G Landtmann, *The Origin of the Inequality of the Social Classes* (1938)

10 I have discussed this more fully in my *New Democracy and the New Despotism* (1939). See also A B White, *Self Government at the King's Command* (1939), for the ultimate possibilities. See A Kolnai, *The War against the West* (1938), Peter F Drucker, *The End of Economic Man* (1939), Hermann Rauschning, *Revolution des Nihilismus* (1939)

11 Merriam, *New Democracy*, p 237

12 On emergency powers see Carl Schmitt, *Die Diktatur* (2d ed., 1928). H R Spencer, "Dictatorship," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol V, G S Ford (ed.) *Dictatorship in the Modern World* (2d ed., 1939)

13 See the studies in the sociology of revolution (cited below at chap iii, n 14), by Edwards, Sorokin, Brinton, and Pettee. See Oscar Jaszi's review of Brinton, *American Political Science Review*, XXXVIII (1939), 298-99

14 W F Ogburn, *Social Change*, and Mayo, *op cit*, chaps vi-viii

15 See my *The Role of Politics in Social Change*, chap 1, "Boycotting Government", and *The New Democracy*, pp 205-7

16 J P Comer, *Legislative Functions of National Administrative Authorities* (1927), John Dickinson, *Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of Law* (1927), Ernst Freund, *Administrative Powers over Persons and Property* (1928), W Jellinek, *Verwaltungsrecht* (1931), F Blatchly and M Oatman, *Administrative Legislation and Adjudication* (1934), R M Cooper, "The Proposed United States Administrative Court," *Michigan Law Review*, XXXV (December, 1936), 193-252, and (February, 1937), 363-96, *President's Committee on Administrative Management Report with Special Studies* (1937), especially the studies of R E Cushman and J Hart, also E B Stason, "Administrative Tribunals: Organization and Reorganization," *Michigan Law Review*, XXXVI (1938), 533-67, R E Cushman, "Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Com-

missions," *Cornell Law Quarterly*, XXIV (December, 1938), 13-53, and (February, 1939), 163-97. The contemporary issues are being discussed in the political science and law journals. See on the "Logan Bill": G. Hankin, "The Logan Bill," *Kentucky Law Journal*, XXVII (1938), 3-44, and current hearings in Congress.

17. See H. McBain and L. Rogers, *The Living Constitution* (1927); Merriam, *The Written Constitution and the Unwritten Attitude* (1931); E. S. Corwin, *Court over Constitution* (1938).

18. *Fragment on Government*.

19. J. B. Bury, *A History of Freedom of Thought* (1913). See also Lasswell on "Censorship," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. III; "Freedom of Inquiry," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (1938).

20. *Political Power*, chap. vi. See in general on these aspects Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (1922) and *Phantom Public* (1925); Lasswell, Casey, and Smith, *Propaganda and Promotional Activities* (1935); L. W. Doob, *Propaganda* (1937); and W. Albig, *Public Opinion* (1939).

21. T. N. Whitehead, *The Industrial Worker* (1938) and *Leadership in a Free Society* (1936); P. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination* (1935); F. J. Roethlisberger and W. Dickson, *Management and the Worker: Technical vs. Social Organization in an Industrial Plant* (1934); W. B. Cornell, *Organization and Management in Industry and Business* (rev. ed., 1936); E. Mayo, *op. cit.*; J. D. Mooney and A. C. Reiley, *Onward Industry* (1931). See also Taylor Society publications.

Psychology and psychiatry are producing an increased sureness of insight, if not of scientific measurability of the factors of human psychology which are operating to produce the present stage of man's inhumanity to man. We can no longer rest content with attributing social disorganization and pathology to the instrument of personal devils. It is not merely that good will is lacking among power-holders but rather that they grope for comprehension in an unintegrated world and, groping, are beset by an insecurity that accounts for their overreaction to the challenge of change, demagogic or scientific. An increase in social *anomie* may lead to an overreaction in the direction of overhierarchization, too great rigidity in the social and political structure, and eventually to a thunderous overexplosion in the society. To advocate merely a change of heart and of outlook is not enough; good will without a sound program is not enough. Alternative programs are indispensable. See on this latter aspect the literature on planning cited below, chap. iii, n. 8.

On the topics of social disorganization and insecurity see Franz Alexander, "Psychoanalysis and Social Disorganization," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLII (1937), 781-813; E. Mayo, "Psychiatry and Sociology in Relation to Social Disorganization," *ibid.*, pp. 825-31; P. Schilder, "The Relation between Social and Personal Disorganization," *ibid.*, pp. 832-39; D. Slight, "Disorganization in the Individual and in Society," *ibid.*, pp. 840-47. A different point of view appears in G. Allport, *Personality* (1937). On the problems raised by indus-

trial malaise see E. A. Rundquist and R. F. Sletto, *Personality in the Depression* (1936); also Rundquist's "Behavior Problems and the Depression," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XXXIII (1938), 237-60; E. W. Bakke, *The Unemployed Man* (1933); J. M. Williams, *Human Aspects of Unemployment and Relief* (1933); P. Eisenberg and P. Lazarsfeld, "The Psychological Effects of Unemployment," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1933, pp. 358-90.

On the more specifically political aspects see the works of Lasswell, cited, and (with Blumenstock) *World Revolutionary Propaganda* (1939); R. Michels, "Psychologie der antikapitalistischen Massenbewegungen," *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*, IX (1926), 1; F. H. Allport, "Psychology in Relation to Social and Political Problems," in P. S. Achilles (ed.), *Psychology at Work* (1932); H. F. Gosnell, "Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVIII, 735-48; K. Birnbaum, *Grundzüge der Kulturpsychopathologie* (1924); E. Glover, *The Dangers of Being Human* (1936); F. L. Schuman, *The Nazi Dictatorship* (1935); T. Abel, *Why Hitler Came to Power* (1938); Kurt Lewin, "Psycho-social Problems of a Minority Group," *Character and Personality*, III (1935), 175-87.

Limitations of space prevent my inclusion in this work of adequate discussion of the relation between values and skills in the domain of politics. I have in preparation an examination of this much contested problem, as a part of a larger study of systematic politics. It will be found, I may say, that some of those who assert the supremacy of "values" really have in mind a specific form of power organization (hierarchy) through which their special "values" are made authentic, and, on the other hand, that some of those who profess to exclude all "values" really smuggle in their own assumptions without sharp intellectual challenge.

22. On the basis of representation there is a vast literature by guild socialists, syndicalists, anarcho-syndicalists, and pluralists, of many varieties, mingled and intersected with the advocacy of proportional representation. One of the best sources is still the article by Francis W. Coker, "Pluralistic Theories and the Attack on State Sovereignty," in Merriam and Barnes (eds.), *A History of Political Theories: Recent Times* (1924), pp. 80-120. See also Hoag and Hallett's standard work, *Proportional Representation* (1926); J. H. Humphrey's *Proportional Representation* (1911), with Friedrich, *op. cit.*, chap. xvii, and see F. H. Hermens, "The Trojan Horse of Democracy," *Social Research*, V (November, 1938), 379-424. See Coker and Rodee, "Representation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. XIII. See also the very thorough critical summary and excellent bibliography of Friedrich in *Constitutional Government and Politics* (1937), chaps. xvi and xvii, and pp. 539-44.

23. This problem was considered by A. D. Lindsay in his *Democracy* (1929) but has received inadequate consideration from the profession thus far.

24. On the legislative pension in New York see chapters 741, 591, and 66, of the *Laws of 1920, 1922, and 1932, as Amended 1938*.

25 See *Problems of a Changing Population*, report of the Committee on Population Problems of the National Resources Committee (1938)

26 Merriam and Gosnell, *The American Party System* (1923, 2d ed., 1940)

27 See the *Report of the Departmental Committee on the Qualifications, Recruitment, Training, and Promotion of Local Government Officers* (the Hadow Committee) (1934) and the *Report of the President's Committee on Administrative Management* (1937)

III

THE IDEAL STATE

1 See my *Political Power*, chap. viii, pp. 243-45, and K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (1939)

2 J. B. S. Holdane, *Daedalus: Or Science and the Future* (1924), and other volumes in the series "Today and Tomorrow" (London: Kegan Paul & Co., Ltd.) For a conservative view see H. Freyer, *Die politische Insel* (1936)

3 Innumerable writers have speculated on the normative purposes of the state. See Dunning's three volumes and Merriam and Barnes (eds.), *op. cit.* See also W. W. Willoughby, *The Ethical Basis of Political Authority* (1930), Robison, *Political Ethics* (1935). Friedrich lists territorial expansion, security, reduction of internal and external friction, and prosperity. These categories skirt the fundamental norms which, though often implicit, lie at the base of the constitutional consensus.

4 J. Strachey (*The Coming Struggle for Power* [1935]) sees only ultimate collapse—unless, of course, his own plan is adopted.

5 See, however, G. Reimann, *Germany: World Empire or World Revolution* (1939), Merle Fainsod, *The Origins of the Third International, 1914-19* (1934), and cf. H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935).

6 Cf., however, G. Borgese, "Pius XII and the Axis," *Notion*, V (March, 1939), 148, 285-88; J. Bernhart, *The Vatican as a World Power* (1939).

7 *The Price of Peace* ('Cobden Lecture') (1935), p. 12. The points enumerated as the price are: (1) the sacrifice of the free shaping of the aims of foreign policy, (2) the sacrifice of national sovereignty over armaments, (3) world-institutions to put on a co-operative basis the production and distribution of the main goods and the management and workings of the main services, (4) the abandonment of national propaganda, and co-operation in the international organization for dissemination of truth. See other lectures of this series, especially Gustave Cassel, *From Protectionism through Planned Economy to Dictatorship* (1934).

8 Analyses of the world's resources, such as Hermann Kranold's *International Distribution of Raw Materials* (1939), are very useful. See "Who Owns the World," in *International Economic Relations*, by the Commission of Inquiry into National Policy in International Economic Relations (1934). On United States

see 1 A Berle and G C Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* (1932), National Resources Committee, *Consumption in the United States* (1938), *The Structure of the American Economy* (1939) See also studies made by the League of Nations Economic Committee and by Political and Economic Planning (P.E.P.) in England

9 V Lecky, *History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe* (2 vols., 1865), A D White, *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (2 vols., 1896), F C Corvbeare, *History of New Testament Criticism* (1910), H C Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages* (3 vols., 1888), J M Robertson, *A Short History of Free Thought* (rev. ed., 1936)

10 On the penchant for pontification in fields where they lack expertise see M Cohen, "Method, Scientific," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol X For an interesting example of a type see B W Douglass (former state entomologist of Indiana), "An Entomologist Looks at the New Deal," in the Gannett periodical, *America's Future*, I, No 4 (1937), 12 ff

11 See my *Civic Education in the United States* (1934) For recent developments in Nazi Germany see Erika Mann, *School for Barbarians* (1939) See my *Making of Citizens* (1931) for full discussion of the various systems

12 John Dollard et al, *Frustration and Aggression* (1939) See also G Megaro, *Musculini in the Making* (1938) The problem of adjusting personalities to vocations and to demand is still an unsolved one On this see W Kotching, *Unemployment in the Learned Professions* (1937)

13 Psychiatry may, however, be on the way to a wider application in the schools See D A Prescott, *Emotion in Education* (1938)

14 On waste in revolutions see P Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution* (1925), J Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (1932), and C Brinton, *Anatomy of Revolution* (1939) Cf G Pettee, *Process of Revolution* (1939), pp 10-29

15 See *Hadrian the Seventh* (1937), by Baron Corvo (F W Rolfe), an interesting suggestion in fictional form of the possibilities of papal authority

16 On a union of religion and science, government, and art see E E Aubrey, *Present Theological Tendencies* (1936)

17 See *Role of Politics in Social Change*, chaps 1, II, V, VI See also Julius Kahn (president of the Truscon Steel Co.), "A Plea for More Government Regulation," *Nation & Business*, XVI, No 2 (February, 1928), 20-22 "This is a highly individual point of view," the editor wrote, "an interesting point of view, but not the point of view of *Nation's Business*" (*ibid*)

18 Possible unification of value systems is, of course, the function of both politics and administration See *Political Power*, chap VII, especially pp 191-93

19 See above, chap 1, n 93

20 Kropotkin began the long struggle to emancipate social theory from the illusion of Spencer's social Darwinism in *Mutual Aid, a Factor in Evolution* Anthropological studies have shown the 'normality' of co-operative patterns in other than Western cultures See Margaret Mead, *Co operation and Competition*

among Primitive People (1937); L. W. Doob and Mark May, *Competition and Co-operation* (1937); and article on "Co-operation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. IV.

21. E. Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (1933), chap. vi; and L. K. Frank, "The Management of Tensions," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXXIII, 705-36.

22. On the creative role of association see M. P. Follette, *The New State* (1918); G. Overmayer, *Government and the Arts* (1939); Otto H. Gierke, *The Development of Political Theory* (1939, trans. Freyd), *Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (1868).

23. Cited by G. Seldes, *The Vatican* (1934).

24. One answer is, of course, the development of self-regulation by codes of ethics. The growth of self-consciousness of skill has assisted the development of such codes among the various established professions, most recently among the city-managers. Yet "guildism" has its own weaknesses. See also *Political Power*, chap. vi.

25. See *Political Power*, chap. iv, and H. D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How*, chaps. ii-v and ix.

26. Consult Clyde Eagleton, *The Attempt To Define War* (1933); Quincy Wright, "The Concept of Aggression," *American Journal of International Law*, XXIX (1935), 373-93, and "The Test of Aggression in the Italo-Ethiopian War," *ibid.*, XXX (1936), 43-56; J. Diamandesco, *Le Problème de l'aggression dans le droit international public actuel* (1936). The other facet is, of course, the prevention of the occurrence of the conditions making for aggression. On this see Quincy Wright, *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace* (1935), and Clyde Eagleton, *Analysis of the Problem of War* (1937).

27. See Eduard Beneš, *Democracy, "Today and Tomorrow"* (1939).

28. Merriam and Gosnell, *The American Party System*, and A. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics* (1929). Contrast the comments of Mortimer Adler in "Parties and the Common Good," *Review of Politics*, Vol. I (January, 1939), and compare the rejoinder by F. Hermens, in *ibid.*, pp. 191-212.

29. See Merriam, *Role of Politics in Social Change*, chap. iv; also Ogburn, "Change, Social," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. III.

IV

THE TASKS OF POLITICS

The wide-ranging extent of the discussions of the tasks of politics makes it impossible to do more than indicate some of the more obvious source material. An excellent finding-list is given in W. A. Dunning's *Political Theories* (4 vols. [last vol. edited by Merriam and Barnes]; 1902, 1905, 1920, 1924), in F. W. Coker's *Recent Political Thought*

(1934), in J. B. Mayer's *Political Thought* (1939), and in other standard histories of political theory, such as T. I. Cook, *History of Political Philosophy from Plato to Burke* (1936), and G. H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (1937). See also my *New Aspects of Politics* (2d. ed.).

The *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* is a bibliographical mine worthy of wide use. With this may be used Burchfield's *Student's Guide to Materials in Political Science* (1935), prepared for the American Political Science Association. Systematic treatises such as Kelsen's *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (1925), R. M. McIver's *The Modern State* (1926), R. Smend's *Verfassung und Verfassungsrecht* (1928), Laski's *Grammar of Politics* (1925), Catlin's *Principles of Politics* (1930), Lasswell's *Politics* (1936), Wackernagel's *Der Wert des Staats* (1934), Friedrich's *Constitutional Government* (1937), and various other treatises afford an introduction to the problem of the tasks of politics.

But all the formal treatises on government give a very incomplete picture unless they are supplemented by an examination of a broad range of studies in a number of neighboring fields; philosophy, ethics, economics, sociology, anthropology, psychology, history, and law contribute so greatly to an understanding of the realm of politics that their findings and conclusions are indispensable to anything more than an amateur understanding of the political.

1. *Lysistrata*, tr. Benjamin Rogers (London, 1924), III, 59-61.

2. The words "rational," "irrational," and "nonrational" are bandied about rather freely in a great many works, without much attempt at standardization of meaning-reference. As often as not, there is scant effort to indicate the usage at all.

We may raise the question whether or not the logicians are agreed as to what "logic" means, and whether or not logicians and scientists are agreed as to what "scientific" means. Social scientists seem to be all too little aware of the fact that there are conflicting schools of thought among the specialists in both aspects, being perhaps too impressed by the exaggerated claims of the adherents of one school or another. But when we note the disagreement, we must proceed ultra-cautiously in making blanket reference to "logic" or "science." See S. D. Bernal, *The Social Function of Science* (1939), and bibliography there cited; also Josiah Stamp, *The Science of Social Adjustment* (1937).

Consult T. Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), *passim*, especially for the summaries of Marshall, Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber. This volume makes some excellent and acute distinctions. Mannheim has distinguished the rational, irrational, and nonrational in his *Rational and Irrational Elements in Contemporary Society* (1934); see also *Ideology and Utopia*, trans. Wirth and Shils (1936). A long line of anthropologists, ethnologists, sociologists, social psycholo-

gists, psychologists, psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, politicians, and others have dealt with the various aspects of this problem. One should not, indeed, omit the philosophers or those economists whose dialectical naivete propagated the refined abstraction of the economic man until it became the predominating stereotype of the totality of the species *Homo*.

We have had studies of the "mind of the primitives," of the language and thought of the "child," and then, concurrently, a growing picture of the thought and behavior patterns of adults in our own cultures. How much of our reactions is simple reflexes, how much is dominated by an involuntary or autonomic nervous system, how much is subject to modification by social and individual calculation, reflection, will, and control—these are matters of amount and intensity wherein we are still in the dark. See "The Possibility of a Science of Politics," in S. A. Rice (ed.), *Methods in Social Science* (1931).

3 The distinction here is between the behavior viewed from the standpoint of the actor and the behavior viewed *qua* behavior in the scheme of things. Dialectically, any act has certain, and only certain, consequences in the given situation. In our Western metaphysics, with its assumption of the rational pattern of nature, this conclusion is obvious. But the simultaneous nonrationality of the act—or its irrationality—from the locus of the actor, involves no contradiction, although the point is sometimes alleged.

An act may be rational as producing the pattern of ends seen by the self-consciously analytical rulers of a society, yet from the standpoint of the person who performs it from the force of habit, imitation, or some other form of suggestion, it may be nonrational. Again, there are the forms of action that are purely reflex or automatic, apart from social conditioning. This type of behavior is predicted daily by the average man as a matter of course and is predicted with greater precision by advertisers, merchants, political leaders, and the like, in addition to the examples given.

4 There is a growing body of more precise investigations of the effect of various kinds of stimuli on attitudes and response. The whole gamut of studies in the measurement of attitudes, represented by Thurstone and others and the continuing studies of Behaviorists and Gestaltists, are all directed toward the developing of principles of the regularity of these types of response. For an interesting study in the field of political responses see Lasswell and Blumenstock, *World Revolutionary Propaganda* (1939). See, in general, W. Allig, *Public Opinion* (1939).

This attack interests a group of researchers in various specialties in social science, such as Mayo, Warner, J. Dollard, Sapir, Lasswell, and others, while many psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, such as Karen Horney, are gravitating to the same approach.

5 The monopoly of violence is observed for all past states and for all present units—except perhaps for a few rare instances among the primitives. Will this be a characteristic in a future when the insights of today become the tested

facts of tomorrow' When men become self-aware through the medium of a sound education? When rulers utilize the skills of the psychiatrist as readily as they use those of the physician at present? When vocational guidance, in conjunction with an advanced psychology, gives more and more balanced personalities to fit into the places which tests show them to fit? When objective standards for the exchange and intervaluation of human services have been developed? In that day the necessity for the monopoly of force will have gone, and it will no longer be a part of the concept of the political. And in that day the concepts following this line, such as those of Hobbes, and Machiavelli before him, of Pareto after him, and of Carl Schmitt, will be seen to be generic—but not universal.

6 This was, read carefully, the view of Montesquieu and of many of the philosophers in their moments of candor. The nineteenth century, dominated by individualistic theory, curiously failed to produce many statements of such a position, although the beginnings of sociology and the slow percolation of Darwinism had later developments in end-century realism. Marxian and other types of determinism of the historical and evolutionary type were to end in a realization of the truth of the paradox mentioned above, that if men but learned the "laws" by which they were molded, they could, under certain other conditions, mold themselves—just as, having learned the regularities of the physical world, they were able to mold it in accordance with its own "determinism." Wallas and a host of social scientists dealt with the means of "social control" and the elements of which this was constructed. From blind evolution men gleaned the concept of "creative evolution." In the present the study of the manipulation of symbols and attitudes, of behaviors and institutional change, proceeds in the latter terms as "the proper study of mankind" becomes more precise. Interpreted in more familiar language, the "collective illusions" of Mosca and the "residues" of Pareto (in part) become the techniques of propaganda with which we are amply familiar in our own vocabularies. See Merriam, *Political Power*, chap. vii, Lasswell, *Politics, by whom*.

7 The constant interchange of skilled personnel by the Nazi and Italian governments for the Franco side, and by others for the Loyalist side, in the Spanish Civil War, and the current use of various technicians and strategists by the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese conflict are instances readily grasped by all.

8 See, on skills, the references given for Lasswell's *Politics, Who Gets What, When, How*, chap. vi.

9 R. Michels, 'Zur historischen Analyse des Patriotismus,' *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, XXXVI, 14-43, 399, 449.

10 See my *Political Power*, chap. 11, L. K. Frank, "Art and Living," *American Magazine of Art*, XXIV (1932), 24-25. President Hoover's Research Committee, *Recent Social Trends*, p. 75.

The treatment of values, of course, began in earliest antiquity, and the Western world begins its study with the classical thinkers. But the philosophers,

the priests, and the rulers have encountered great difficulty in universalizing any one set of values. The failure has not stopped the quest—or induced great degrees of modesty and humility in their successors—down to the men of the present. Out of the vast literature on ethics, morals, axiology, theology-religion, norms, political ideals, etc., see, for the analysis of much recent thought, Dewey and Tuft, *Ethics* (1908); C. Bouglé, *Leçons de sociologie sur l'évolution des valeurs* (1908); R. B. Perry, *General Theory of Value* (1926). For a general summary of contemporary ethics, consult Laird, *Recent Philosophy* (1936). See also J. Dewey, "Theory of Valuation," *International Encyclopaedia of Unified Science*, Vol. II (1939).

11. The clashing schools in sociology, social psychology, and psychology discuss this problem once again in the May, 1939, issue of the *American Journal of Sociology*. See also L. Gulick and L. Urwick, *Papers on the Science of Administration*.

12. L. K. Frank, "Structure, Function, and Growth," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. IV (January, 1937). See, however, J. F. Brown, "Individual, Group, and Social Field," *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIV (May, 1939), 858-68. See also C. J. Herrick, *Neurological Foundations of Behavior*, and R. Childs, *Physiological Foundations of Human Behavior*.

13. This is the problem long grasped by the jurisprudentes chiefly of the analytical school—that norms of procedure develop before and effect operations from which norms of substantive law may be progressively delineated.

14. See, however, Allee, *op. cit.*, who finds ant life the highest known type of organized living.

15. We shall come to some standardization of symbols in the end. See C. H. Titus, "A Nomenclature in Political Science," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XXV. Statistics seems for the moment to be the most systematic language in use among the more quantitative of our colleagues. See my *New Aspects of Politics* (1925).

16. The quest for a synthesis is by no means an abandoned one. The need for a universal grammar was noticed before the advent of the Logical Positivists, by the medievalists, by Leibniz, and in different fashion by Comte. Contemporary Catholic controversialists, like Etienne Gilson and Jacques Maritain, build on the towering works of the "angelic doctor" of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas. See St. Thomas's *Summa*. Attention-compelling in the contemporary period are the approaches projected in *The Encyclopaedia for Unified Science*, to be carefully followed for possible methodological fruitfulness.

The philosophic or total view continues to be attempted, and Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics* (3 vols., 1938) is another attempt at a philosophy of history. It is very tempting to confront this with the caustic criticisms of such attempts found in his own *Contemporary Sociological Theories* (1928).

The partial or abstract aspect view is advocated by Catlin, *op. cit.* (above,

p. 101), and Parsons, *op. cit.* (above, n. 2), to mention two representative instances.

It is to be doubted whether, in a day when dynamic psychology moves toward the precise by the use of precise languages and rigorous conceptual structures, political science will be content, as one authority recently observes, with "literary psychology." To resign ourselves to rough generalizations is to make no improvement upon Aristotle at all.

17. National Resources Committee, *Our Cities* (1938); L. Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (1938).

18. On a reallocation of powers in American government see W. Y. Elliott's *Need for Constitutional Reform* (1933). See also Jane P. Clark, *The Rise of New Federalism* (1938).

19. See F. M. Russell, *Theories of International Relations* (1936); G. Butler and S. Maccoby, *The Development of International Law* (1938); H. Lauterpacht, *The Function of Law in the International Community* (1932); H. Kelsen, *Allgemeine Staatslehre*; A. Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law* (1936).

20. H. D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity* (1935).

21. On the re-emergence of political economy see B. Lippincott (ed.), *Government Control of the Economic Order* (1935).

22. League of Nations, *World Economic Survey, Sixth Year, 1936-37* (1937); J. Donaldson, *International Economic Relations: A Treatise on World Economy and World Politics* (1928); Sir A. Salter, *World Trade and Its Future* (1936); Eugene Staley, *Raw Materials in Peace and War* (1937).

23. On the National Resources Committee of the United States see above, chap. iii, n. 8. For those who see bloody revolution under the bed at the mere mention of "planning" (such as W. Lippmann in *The Good Society* [1938] and W. E. Rappard, *The Crisis of Democracy* [1938]) reference may be made to the cool and detached analysis of the ideology of the National Resources Committee in A. C. Gruchy's "The Economics of the National Resources Committee," *American Economic Review*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (March, 1939).

24. See my *The Role of Politics in Social Change* (1937), *passim*.

